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One Europe or None

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Abstract:
The European post-Cold War order assumed monist forms. Instead of the geopolitical and ideological diversity sought by Mikhail Gorbachev as he brought the Cold War to an end in the late 1980s, a type of monist cold peace was imposed in which Atlantic security institutions and ideas were consolidated. The monism was both institutional and ideational, and the two reinforced each other in a hermetic order that sought to insulate itself from critique and transformation. Russia was excluded as anything but subaltern. The post-Cold War European peace order was thus built on weak foundations, provoking a cycle of mimetic rivalry. In Russia the fateful dialectic of external challenge and domestic stultification once again operated, heightening the Kremlin’s threat perceptions. Russia’s relations with the European Union (EU) and Washington veered between the cooperative and the confrontational, until settling into a conflictual mode in 2014, as it is argued in the article.

Keywords: monism, neo-revisionism, Russia, European Union, United States

It would not be unreasonable to suggest that it was incumbent on those who claimed to have won the Cold War to create the conditions for a viable and enduring peace. Just as there were no real victors after the Great War, yet a punitive peace was imposed on Germany that created the conditions for the renewal of conflict, so too the peace order after 1989 reflected the asymmetrical end to the Cold War. On the one side the institutions that had maintained the Soviet bloc were dismantled, whereas on the other side the Atlantic security system was maintained and in the end enlarged to encompass much of the territory of its former adversary. The European post-Cold War order assumed monist forms. Instead of the geopolitical and ideological diversity sought by Mikhail Gorbachev as he brought the Cold War to an end in the late 1980s, a type of monist cold peace was imposed in which Atlantic security institutions and ideas were consolidated. The monism was both institutional and ideational, and the two reinforced each other in a hermetic order that sought to insulate itself from critique and transformation. Russia was excluded as anything but
subaltern. The post-Cold War European peace order was thus built on weak foundations, provoking a cycle of mimetic rivalry. In Russia the fateful dialectic of external challenge and domestic stultification once again operated, heightening the Kremlin’s threat perceptions. Russia’s relations with the European Union (EU) and Washington veered between the cooperative and the confrontational, until settling into a conflictual mode in 2014.

1. The Many Europes

The countries in between that had formerly been in thrall to Moscow of course jumped at the chance to become part of the alternative security system, but this only reinforced the competitive bloc politics that had been at the heart of the Cold War. In other words, the negative transcendence of the Cold War created a perverse incentive structure that failed to overcome the logic of conflict but only gave it new forms. Gorbachev has been much criticised for the allegedly inept way in which he handled Soviet foreign policy in the final period, above all for having failed to get written agreement to the embargo on NATO enlargement (for a discussion see Sarotte, 2014, pp. 90-97; 2009). This rather misses the point. In launching perestroika and advancing the ideas of the New Political Thinking (NPT), Gorbachev sought to devise policies that would transcend the logic of domestic repression and international confrontation. This was an idealistic politics of transcendence, but in the circumstances this policy was also starkly realist in responding to the fundamental challenges facing Soviet society and European security. It was not unrealistic to expect that in return for Soviet, and later Russian, accommodation to Western security concerns, Russia would be granted a commensurate status in some sort of restructured security order. That at least was Gorbachev’s calculation and Russia’s anticipation until the breakdown of the cold peace in 2014.

In the post-Cold War era, there were two fundamentally different paths for Europe to follow. The first was to pursue the politics of transcendence outlined by Gorbachev, to create a ‘greater West’. The model here is of a genuinely plural Europe, comprising the EU, Russia, Turkey and various lands in between, held together by deepening institutional and other pan-European ties (Sakwa, 2010, p. 21). The ‘smaller’ EU would have enlarged within the framework of ‘wider Europe’, but at the same time some sort of special institutionalised partnership arrangement with Russia and other countries, including Turkey, would have been established (Gromyko and Fëdorova, 2014). The Atlantic alliance would have endured but in new forms, now subordinated to the commitment to build an inclusive and equitable pan-European community as one of the pillars of the new continentalism. This is the project for the creation of a transformed historic West, in which Russia would become a founder member with a stake in its perpetuation. This would have created a greater West, which would have provided a framework for the development of the European system of sovereign states, where some unite in deeper
regional bodies (notably the EU) while others engage on a selective basis. Iron curtains would have become a thing of the past and the hard edges between divergent forms of association would have been removed. The very idea of security dilemmas in Europe would have become anachronistic.

The greater European option shifts away from Brusello-centric representations of Europe and instead focuses on a pan-continental form of unity, drawing not only on Gorbachev’s idea for a Common European Home but also on long-standing Gaullist ideas of a Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok (Gorbachev, 1989). At its most radical, this would entail the dissolution of NATO and the Atlantic security system and the creation of a symmetrical and pluralistic Europe. The CSCE would become the pre-eminent security body, accompanied possibly by the creation of the European Security Council that was mooted in the early 1990s. The EU would assume greater security responsibilities as European security is gradually decoupled from the single Atlantic community. The security association with the US would become redundant as Europe takes control of its own destiny. This over-arching greater European body represents the ‘integration of integrations’, bringing together what have now become the EU and the EEU, creating both a process and the embryonic institutions under whose aegis the continent could unite. This would represent a way for the EU to escape involution through its continued embedment in the Atlantic system which had given birth to it in the first place.

The second path is the one actually pursued, and has had some demonstrably negative consequences. NATO enlarged to Russia’s borders, the 1972 ABM Treaty was unilaterally abrogated in 2002 and elements of ballistic missile defence (BMD) installed in Eastern Europe. The EU became part of a singular ‘wider Europe’ enlarging also to Russia’s borders. Palliative measures operated, including the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council and various EU plans to moderate Russia’s exclusion, including the ‘four common spaces’ and the Partnership for Modernisation. The third path represented an unstable combination that in the end exploded under the weight of its own contradictions. It effectively represented the continuation of the Cold War by other means. This was the period of the cold peace, which as I have argued elsewhere, represented a type of ‘mimetic Cold War’, in which the arguments and institutions of the Cold War were perpetuated, but recognition of the fact was suppressed (Sakwa, 2013). As in the interwar years, this was another ‘twenty years’ crisis’, in which not a single fundamental problem of European security was resolved (Sakwa, 2008).

This provoked an accumulation of tensions, akin to the years leading up to the Great War, which predictably ended in overt conflict. The Russo-Georgian war of 2008 was the first major sign that armed conflict between European states had not been banished from the continent, but it was only the precursor to the even graver crisis over Ukraine in 2014. We can justifiably talk of the ‘death of Europe’, in the sense that the aspirations
for a new united continent voiced at the end of the Cold War were confounded, and continental Europe as the subject of its own history was once again lost as it became the playground for competing global ambitions (Sakwa, 2015c). There is a vigorous debate over what to call this new era of confrontation following the cold peace, but ultimately whether we call it a ‘New Cold War’ or something else is less important than recognising the great failure of our generation to create a sustainable and enduring peace order in Europe.

This article argues that post-Cold War EU has become involuted – in other words, stunted and incapable of fundamental evolutionary development – because it remained trapped in the Atlantic carapace in which it had been born. Greater Europe or some other construct in the event were rejected in favour of the consolidation of a monist interpretation of the end of the Cold War. The monist Atlantic system then expanded through the enlargement of existing structures and ideas, repudiating the transformative vision outlined at the end of the Cold War by Gorbachev and successive Russian leaders. It is this monist system which now predominates in Western Europe.

2. Euromonism and Involution

The smaller Europe is monistic to the degree that it cannot imagine a legitimate alternative framework for European development. Although the EU claims to be post-modern, that very claim is couched in the form of a classical modernist meta-narrative, and thus repudiates the claim itself. The EU has from the outset been a monist project, although intensely pluralistic internally. The EU’s claims to normative universality means that its engagement with neighbours is part of a transformative project to make them more like itself. The practical policies of the EU contain a healthy dose of pragmatism, yet they remain driven by a didactic agenda (Casier, 2013). In the post-Cold War era this monism has intensified. The goal became to transform the continent in the EU’s image.

Although the term ‘wider Europe’ was swiftly discarded by the EU in favour of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) nomenclature, the goal remained much the same – to transform the neighbourhood through conditionality, Association Agreements and in some cases accession. In principle both the smaller Europe and the wider Europe were compatible with the type of pluralist ‘greater Europe’ advocated by Russia, but this would have required an institutional and diplomatic process. Both sides would have had to find some sort of ‘mode of reconciliation’, of the sort that transcended the logic of conflict between France and Germany in the post-war years. The ‘victory in the Cold War’ discourse prevalent in the West precisely precluded even recognition of the need for this reconciliatory process. It was enough for Russia to transform itself in the West’s image, and when

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1 For a convincing argument that the use of the term is anachronistic and perverse, see Monaghan (2015).
it failed to do so, recriminations ensued, including the strange discourse of “who lost Russia?” (Stoner and McFaul, 2015).

Moscow’s position is predicated on the assumption that there is no intrinsic link between a state’s domestic governance arrangements and the pattern of its engagement in international politics. This is one of the central postulates of realist theory, which also suggests that democratic peace theory can be an impediment to normal relations between states with different regime types.² This does not mean that Russia has an unbounded commitment to Westphalian sovereignty, since in the post-Cold War era Russia has been a great joiner of bodies that limit sovereignty in one way or another, notably the Council of Europe, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and was even in the process of joining the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) before the Ukraine storm broke. Undoubtedly there is a governance problem within Russia, with the regime exercising tutelary powers over both civil and political society, leading to developmental and political blockages (Sakwa, 2014). The domestic impasse was both cause and consequence of the impasse in foreign affairs, each amplifying the other.

Russia’s advocacy of pluralism at the international level is in an inverse relationship to the monism practiced at home, while the EU’s monism in international politics is balanced by extreme internal pluralism. The EU is today typically portrayed as a post-modern entity committed to a post-Westphalian agenda of universal values, accompanied by a commitment to a set of normative principles (Cooper, 2003). These norms are the basis for the EU’s conditionality in dealing with external actors and its neighbours. Internally, the EU has assumed the characteristics of a neo-medieval polity, with overlapping jurisdictions and no single sovereign centre (Zielonka, 2007). However, externally in recent years it has assumed an increasingly hard spatial configuration. Its external borders are mostly governed by Schengen regulations, allowing a single visa to operate across the participant countries and the passport-free movement of peoples within the zone. The pressure of refugee and migratory flows from 2015 prompted a wave of suspensions and wall-building. The European Agency for the Protection of the Coastline and Border was formed on the basis of Frontex, the body that coordinated European border management.³ It is still too early to talk of a ‘fortress Europe’, especially in light of Germany’s decision in 2015 to accept a million refugees from Syria and other conflict zones, yet the crisis threw into sharp relief the tension between socio-economic and normative post-modernism and the securitisation of relations with the neighbourhood and the world. Time and space came into collision.

Decades of enlargement pushed the EU into uncharted territory, in both symbolic and political terms (Zielonka, 2008). The expansionary dynamic through accession has now

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² See Waltz (2000) for a demolition of democratic peace theory.
³ For the work of the agency, see http://frontex.europa.eu.
slowed, but there is no finalité in either spatial or normative terms. The EU remains an ambitious transformative agent in what are increasingly contested neighbourhoods (Rumelli, 2004). It is this which brought the EU into confrontation with Russia. This is a conflict that neither wanted, and which both sought to avoid. The EU devised variegated neighbourhood policies to ensure that the outer limits of EU territory did not harden into new lines of division. Romano Prodi’s ENP was one of the more imaginative and inclusive attempts to mediate between the ins and outs, as part of the EU’s permanent negotiation of boundaries and interactions with neighbours (Whitman and Wolff, 2010). With the mass accession of a number of post-communist countries, most of which had been part of the Soviet bloc or even of the Soviet Union itself, in 2004 and 2007, the character of this ‘negotiation’ changed, and it became less of an interactive process (to the degree that it ever was), and it became even more didactic. Sergei Prozorov (2016) argues that the relationship was built not on the basis of sovereign equality but on the tutelary principle of teacher and pupil.

This was evident in the manner that the EU’s Common Strategy on Russia (CSR) was devised in 1999, which despite some early contacts with Russian officials “was nevertheless very much a unilateral exercise”. There was not much that was “common”, “in the sense that they are the result of mutual consultations between two partners”, and instead the “common” referred to was the position of the member states (Maresceau, 2004, p. 183). This applied equally to the earlier Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), signed in 1994 but which only came into force on 17 December 1997, as well as the Interim Agreement on trade-related matters signed in 1995: “both proved to be inadequate bilateral instruments for the purposes of governing the relations between the two sides” (Maresceau, 2004, p. 184). In the early years official policy accepted that an active EU was the cornerstone of stability in Europe, but dissenting voices were there from the start. The former USSR ambassador to the European Community, Vladimir Shemyatenkov, argued that “despite all the sweeteners of a partnership, it [EU enlargement] means the actual exclusion of Russia (and the Russians) from the zone of peace, stability and prosperity” (cited in Maresceau, 2004, p. 183). Thus the perceived exclusionary dynamic in security policy was accompanied by an analogous process in the ‘post-modern’ sphere. Just as the ‘greater West’ posited by Russia failed to materialise, so too its greater Europe ambitions were thwarted.

The incorporation of a large cohort of post-communist states only reinforced the EU’s didacticism. The claim was now advanced that because of their historical relationship, these countries were in a unique position to understand Russian motivations and behaviour. As Maria Mälksoo (2013, pp. 158-159) puts it, “the ‘old’ Europe has seemingly preferred (for all sorts of different Realpolitik reasons) to continue the ritualistic game of taking the Russian democratic façade as at least a good-willed work in progress”; whereas “The need to demonstrate the dangers of such mutual simulation and to shake the allegedly widespread ignorance about the Russian misuses of democracy among the core of the traditional West/
Europe ... became a priority on the foreign policy agenda of Estonia in the immediate aftermath of EU accession”. The specific manifestation of this new didacticism was the launching of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in May 2009, an idea sponsored by some of Russia’s most resolute critics in Poland with the assistance of Sweden (Copsey and Pomorska, 2014). Although tempered by the Brussels bureaucracy, the EaP encapsulated the normative challenge that assumed a harshly physical form.

The tension was exacerbated by the universalistic aspirations of the EU as a post-modern norm-based project and the physical manifestation of the EU as a territorially-based entity permanently negotiating its physical engagement with neighbours (Browning, 2005). This engagement deployed a range of traditional diplomatic and other instruments, accompanied by a dynamic of conditionality that tempered realist interactions. As the EU grew and embraced the post-communist region, its dualism became increasingly sharply delineated. The tension between norm and space was exacerbated, and both lost much of their original transformational impetus. The norms were tempered and modified as conditionality itself in certain circumstances became ‘conditional’, dependent on specific local conditions. This is the charge, for example, directed against Estonia and Latvia, where a large number of predominantly Russian ‘non-citizens’ remain to this day (Kochenov, 2008). When it came to space, instead of transcending the ‘borderness’ of borders, as it had so long tried to do and had achieved with such spectacular success among the original members of the EEC, borders were back with a vengeance. They were back not just for pragmatic reasons, such as the management of migrant and refugee flows, but were now manifested as the ‘frontier’ between the empire of good governance and all that was normatively progressive, and the dark and savage lands of corruption and neo-Sovietism on the other side.

The Helsinki process is considered the cornerstone of the post-Cold War security order. Helsinki in effect represents the missing peace congress of our era. Unlike the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, and Yalta/Potsdam in 1945, at the high diplomatic level the end of the Cold War was an un-negotiated peace. The ‘third basket’ of the Helsinki Final Act placed human rights at the heart of European politics for the first time. This was later formalised in the various follow-conferences and enunciated in the ‘Charter of Paris’ in November 1990. The Helsinki process inspired a generation of East European dissidents to call on their Communist governments to obey the commitments to which they had agreed at Helsinki. The embedded assumptions of Helsinki even at the time allowed concessions to be seen as something of a victory over the Soviet Union. The Helsinki framework was absolutely crucial for Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking (NPT) to take root, but the triumphal inflection continued into the post-Cold War era. The CSCE was institutionalised in a number of specialised agencies, including

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4 The triumphal tone of having forced concessions on the USSR in the Helsinki follow-up meetings is evident in recently declassified British Cabinet Office papers. See Gorshkov (2016).
election-monitoring, focusing in particular on the post-Soviet space, an imbalance that was much criticised by Moscow.

This values-based tradition was incorporated into a peculiar strain of Western Europe thinking, which in the end eroded the Egon Bahr tradition of “transformation through rapprochement”. It was this line of thinking that sustained West Germany’s Ostpolitik, but in the end petered out in the fields of the Donbas. The critical line of moral absolutism is particularly strong in the German Greens, who today are among Moscow’s harshest critics, accompanied by much of the French left. They are the most enthusiastic interventionists, bringing them into alignment with the liberal hawks in the US and, perhaps less wittingly, with the transformational agenda of American neo-conservatives. This was the framework after 2014 for the ‘new Atlanticism’, which reinvigorated the military side of the alliance while asserting a virulent and hermetic values-based foreign policy (Sakwa, 2015a; 2005b). The ‘new Atlanticism’ envisages an ever-deepening Atlantic partnership, reinforced by the mooted Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The didactism and monism of the EU is now amplified by the Atlantic alliance as a whole. A new ideational iron curtain once again divides Europe, accompanied by the remilitarisation of continental security.

3. Monism, Multipolarity and Neo-Revisionism

Henry Hale (2005) argues that political studies have failed effectively to explain and predict the dynamics of post-communist societies because it tries to examine those dynamics within the framework of a move towards or away from ideal endpoints. The various crises buffeting the western world after the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008-09 once again brought to the surface the orthodox Soviet belief in the inevitable decline of the western system. As the Valdai 2015 briefing materials put it: “The world is standing at a parting of the ways: will the internal problems of the leading countries and the growing strength of the non-western centres bring us to a revolutionary explosion or will changes be slow and systematic”. The current dominance of the West was acknowledged, but two trends undermined the status quo: “the relative decline of America’s allies, from the EC to Japan, and the narrowing of the gap between them and BRICS countries in terms of influence on global processes”. As far as the Valdai paper was concerned, a “revolutionary demolition of the western-centric global order” was not inevitable, but there was “still scope for orderly reform”. As far as Russia was concerned, “interdependence is turning into a source of pressure and vulnerability” (Valdai Discussion Club, 2015, p. 2). Such views only strengthened those who sought to insulate Russia from external pres-

sure by creating an alternative framework of international governance, while at the same time reinforcing the traditional instruments of diplomacy and great power behaviour. The presentiment of relative western decline is probably exaggerated, yet the shift in the balance of global power is eagerly seized on by Moscow to reinforce its view that the West to which it had not been able to accede is not a West that it wanted to join anyway.

The Ukraine crisis reinforced the growing bipolarity in world affairs. On the one side, the Atlantic alliance was reinforced and intensified. On the other, there were signs of a disparate, mostly inchoate, but nevertheless strengthening tide of counter hegemonic arrangements and organisations. Bobo Lo (2015, p. 9) notes that “the Kremlin seeks to build an alternative ideational and political legitimacy that challenges Western notions of global governance and moral universalism”. This emerging anti-hegemonic movement is nothing like as formalised or intense as its counterparts during the Cold War, since Russia certainly lacks the attractive power, ideological magnetism and economic resources of the USSR. It made no sense for countries wilfully to antagonise the Atlantic powers. Equally, the dangers of unipolarism were clear to all, above all the threat of coercive violence when countries stepped out of political alignment, as the examples of Iraq, Libya and Syria made clear. There was also the increasing threat of the mobilisation of Western financial and governance institutions in the form of sanctions. Economic warfare by the great powers has become yet another mode of engagement in the absence of an effective peace order (Leonard, 2015). In recent years a new doctrine of the universal applicability of American law has been emerging, providing yet another way of leveraging America’s enormous predominance in all significant dimensions of power to the rest of the world (see, for example, Zarate, 2013). Nevertheless, anti-hegemonic movements retain a degree of vitality. There is criticism of “an imposed model that presents itself as universal”, provoking a “demand for alternatives” (Valdai Discussion Club, 2015, p. 4). The emergence of the BRICS\(^6\) grouping is often interpreted as one indication of the establishment not so much of a putative counter-hegemonic alliance as an anti-hegemonic force – opposed to the very idea of hegemonism (Kingah and Quiliconi, 2016).

A number of grandiose schemes have been mooted for the construction of super-fast transport links between Europe and Asia, and there has even been talk of building a maglev line from Beijing to Berlin. In the first instance the focus has been on modernising the existing rail links to high-speed specifications. China is investing some $5.2 billion in a high-speed line, in the first instance to run between Moscow and Kazan (initially planned to open in time for the 2018 FIFA World Cup) accompanied by plans for the line to be extended onwards to China. The projected Trans-Eurasian Belt Development (TEBR from the Russian belt of razvitie) “combines a new geo-economics that departs from the current practices of global political economy, with a new geopolitics.

\(^6\) Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
This geopolitics is based on the cooperative establishment of new human settlements and the accompanying geo-cultural notion of a dialogue of civilisations, derived from Eurasian ideology” (Gromyko, 2015, p. 167). This transcontinental idea was born in Beijing in 1996, and the idea of what Chinese geopolitical thinkers called a ‘continental bridge’ has been reflected in the Chinese ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’, a programme of trade and infrastructure investments stretching from Bangkok to Budapest. This is complemented by the ‘Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk Road’ a plan to link the waterways between the South China Sea and the Mediterranean. Together they comprise what the Chinese call ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR, latterly renamed the Belt and Road Initiative, BRI), which would draw Central Asia and other countries into a China-centred network of investment in infrastructural projects such as railways, roads, ports, pipelines, and customs facilities.

Normative and geopolitical factors are driving Russia and China together. Neither Russia nor China seeks to impose their ideas about how to live on others out of any particular normative concern, but as Fyodor Lukyanov (2015) notes, “partly due to an arrogance that surpasses even that of the West. China is certain of its own exceptional nature. Beijing believes that because foreigners are incapable of grasping Chinese culture and philosophy, there is no point in trying to instil it into them”. More broadly, Lukyanov stresses that with the American imposition of a type of neo-containment on China in the Asia-Pacific region, the situation is more favourable in Eurasia, both in itself and as an alternative route for China to markets in Europe, the Mediterranean and beyond. This is what lay behind the New Silk Road project and its accompanying plan to invest in transport infrastructure to bridge the region between China and the EU. China in Lukyanov’s view is not greatly concerned about increasing its political influence in Central Asia, a sphere in which it is willing to concede to Russia, but when it comes to economic matters, China’s growing preponderance places it in a league of its own. For Russia there are both opportunities and dangers. Lukyanov dismisses fears that the country would become a “raw materials appendage” of China and “has therefore compromised its freedom is a purely subjective evaluation based on ideological considerations”. As he wryly notes, “For some reason, the same observers contend that for Russia to serve as a raw materials appendage of the European Union brings development and progress, but that same relationship to China will inevitably drag Russia into the abyss of backwardness” (Lukyanov, 2015). This may well be a rather too sanguine view. The present failure to achieve a greater West and a greater Europe may well open the door to the creation of a greater Asia.

Russia is very much at the heart of these processes – China for the present prefers to keep its powder dry. This critical stance does not mean that Russia has become a revisionist power. Russia challenges the classical postulates of liberal internationalism while arguing that its participation in anti-hegemonic projects does not repudiate these principles. Russia is instead ‘neo-revisionist’. It does not challenge the system of international law and governance, from which it has benefitted so much, but is critical of the practices and their apparent abuse by ‘hegemonic’ powers. As far as Russia is concerned, it is the West that has become revisionist,
not Russia. Equally, it is not the principles of international law and governance that Russia condemns but the practices that accompany their implementation. In its relations with the EU, Russia’s neo-revisionist stance means that it was unable to become simply the passive recipient of EU norms, and instead strove to become a co-creator of Europe’s destiny (Haukkala, 2008a; 2008b; 2009; 2010). The struggle is not only over contested norms, but also over who has the prerogative to claim their norms as universal in Europe (Haukkala, 2015).

4. Conclusion

Russia’s neo-revisionism seeks to temper the practical application of moral universalism in what are perceived to be arbitrary and punitive ways, while ensuring that the instruments of global governance really do reflect global concerns. The clash in Europe is only part of the broader challenge of representing pluralism at the global level. Western sanctions accelerated the trend to find ways to weaken the dollar, such as pricing oil in gold instead of dollars, but this did not entail withdrawal from global economic integration. China helped Russia to withstand the sanctions, while the BRICS countries began to create an alternative to western-dominated international institutions. The emergence of an alternative globalisation does not mean the reproduction of what is increasingly seen as western monism. As the Valdai discussion paper put it, “The Atlantic community is a unique example of value unification. By contrast, non-western states are together in stressing the importance of diversity, insisting that no uniform emblems of a ‘modern state and society’ are either desirable or possible. This is an approach more in tune with the conditions of a multipolar world” (Valdai Discussion Club, 2015, p. 5). This is the essence of the anti-hegemonic strategy as part of Russia’s mounting resistance to monism in European and global politics. These Eurasian and greater Asia developments represent a way for Russia to escape entrapment in the monism of the Atlantic system and the attendant involution of Europe. The failure to create a unified Europe means that Europe can no longer be considered an autonomous subject of global politics. The lack of one Europe means no substantive Europe in global affairs.

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