London 1940-1945, a Europe in miniature?: the case of Norwegian, Polish and Czechoslovak exiles

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A (DES) CONSTRUÇÃO DA EUROPA (1939-1945)
(DE) CONSTRUCTING EUROPE (1939-1945)
London 1940-1945, A Europe in Miniature?

The Case of Norwegian, Polish and Czechoslovak Exiles

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Abstract

This paper discusses experience of representatives of three European small powers assembled in the London during WWII - Norway, Czechoslovakia and Poland. A common cause, comparable setting and frequent contacts created a promising framework for a new quality of their mutual relations that could, eventually, endorse the European idea. This proved to be at best a partial success: The exiles acted by-and-large as guardians of national interests and identities. As such, and owing to their strained position, they paid considerable attention to status as a principal asset. They subscribed of internalization of their foreign policies and learned or refined their experience with its practices. Yet their visions remained rather regional, with only occasional reference to the idea of European Integration. Albeit the exiles failed to integrate the nations they spoke for, they established closer and better informed transnational ties bound to affect European politics in the years to come.

Keywords: small powers; exile; World War II; foreign policy; integration

When we speak about nations, ‘to integrate’ means ‘to come closer together’ in a pursuit of a common aim. A shared existential threat generates by all means a strong impulse. Nations direct all resources to their survival efforts. As these are often insufficient, it is very advisable to look to pool them on supranational basis. In result coalitions and, if a more cohesive material is present,
communities are born. The European exiles assembled in London during WWII are a perfect example. Ousted from their countries, they found themselves in a very strained position. In most cases they were, as holders of official vestiges, determined to struggle for national and personal causes. Yet on the basis of their severely limited power they had to set out for their quest from a distant periphery. London became their headquarters, from where it should be feasible to ‘set Europe ablaze’. The city hosted an emerging international society with both formal platforms and possibly even more important informal meeting-points where exile leaders and activists might socialize and exchange information. The wartime London was a Europe in miniature. In this paper, I will point out several telling pages from the story of Czechoslovakia, Norway and Poland. As to the choice, a few points are to be made. Firstly, contacts between Norway and the Central Europeans had been limited, free of historical burdens (which would not have been the case once Norway is substituted for Sweden). Secondly, all three states were rim-states which posed comparable security challenges to them. Finally, a question of cohesion and compatibility is appealing: Was their common interest an operating ‘bridge’, and what were the implications for European integration?

**Europe into Pieces**

The thrust of the totalitarian or quasi-totalitarian states redrew the map of Europe in the late 1930s and during the ‘phony war’. Albania, Austria, the Baltic States, Czechoslovakia, Poland or Yugoslavia were invaded and occupied while other powers’ sovereignty, like that of France, Greece, or Denmark, was effectively maimed. International bodies, like the League of Nations, entered a kind of a phantom existence. In less than three years, interwar Europe’s international...
structure was dismembered and many national societies did not fare any better. In result, innumerable emigres, including legitimate political leaders who had lost control of the territory they used to govern, set out from home for safe destinations. Their first station was Paris with its cosmopolitan and even exile traditions⁴, and then, following its rapid fall in June 1940, London. Not only the French Eastern allies sought refuge on the opposite side of the English Channel. The Royal house of Norway and the Labour Nygaardsvold ministry arrived to Scotland on 10 June 1940 and established their headquarters in London. In doing so, the Norwegians followed the Belgian, the Dutch and the Luxemburg examples⁵. Chances of the neutrals seemed to be much worse than in the First World War: In the aftermath of Franco – Hitler meeting at Hendaye (23 October 1940), Armindo Monteiro, the Portuguese minister in London, was alarmed enough to advise that preparations for exile be made in Lisbon⁶. With the war inflagrating the continent, the royal houses of Greece and Yugoslavia followed the path in 1941. In addition, several occupied nations formed the so-called free movements – the Austrians, the Danes, the French – which either had to take a long road to a government-in-exile status or did not intend to act as such at all⁷.

A Bunch of Status Seekers?

The quality of mutual contacts from the interwar period which the exiles were to build upon varied greatly. Beside (not always friendly) neighbours, many occasional acquintances from the international arena met in London. Physical proximity and common agenda opened new venues between nations, encounters of which had been infrequent. If recent traumas were comparable, the shape and conditions of each and every representation appeared to be unique. The legitimacy of exiles is vulnerable due to the mere fact of operating from outside the territory they claim to represent. Several relationships are at stake: with the nation at home as a rule being addressed by alternative pretenders, within the often dispersed exile community and with the foreign hosts and

⁷ Some of these movements (Free Hungarians, Free Italians) operated from the United States.
sponsors who frequently exert dominance. Thus, constitutional continuity and international legal position counted from the very start point as keystones of legitimizing strategies (if by no means a guarantee of success). The exiles clung to them firmly, investing a hierarchy in favour of the governments-in-exile against the free movements. It was advisable to avoid the risks of entering into diplomatic relations with partners whose status might be more disputed than one’s own.

Norwegians had little to be afraid of in this respect, with both the monarch (with close dynastic ties to the House of Windsor) and the entire Labour ministry, eventually transformed into a government of national unity, in London. It had been empowered to act on Norway’s behalf as long as the situation precluded its reunion with the Storting. The so-called Elverum Authority, though immediately became subject to discussions, helped to dispose of later German-inspired motions to depose the King and his council as unconstitutional.

The Polish story was different. Marshall Józef Piłsudski and his aides remembered to add a proviso to the 1935 Constitution allowing the President of the Republic to delegate his office should an emergency force him to leave the country. President Ignacy Mościcki resorted to this tool on 18 September 1939 and declared Gen. Bolesław Wienawa-Długoszewski his successor. The French opposed the choice and the nominee resigned. The opposition and moderate Piłsudskiites compromised: Gen. Władysław Sikorski was proclaimed minister-president and Władysław Rackiewicz, a second-tier Piłsudskiite, the President. The new government was put together by the end of September. The continuity was secured by constitutional means.

The case of Czechoslovakia was the most complicated one. President Edvard Beneš resigned in the aftermath of Munich and left the country. His successor, Emil Hácha, retained his office with a somewhat uncommon title of ‘state-president’ (Staatspräsident) after Czechoslovakia was dismembered in Mid-March 1939. The Prague authorities, despite their limited subjectivity (Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren, Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia) under German auspices, still constituted an international legal entity while Beneš was a private person. This

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notion undermined his authority and engraved the shape of the Czech and Slovak exile, which he began to organize in the spring of 1939. The road to full recognition of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile was a thorny one, by stages including a rather exceptional one of a ‘provisional government’, and took more than two years of concerted political activity (18 July 1941).\(^{12}\)

Perceptions of each other were acutely relevant for the exiles and they were aware of it.\(^{13}\) First and foremost, status perceptions which were bound to emanate from starting points genuine for each and every representation. It is safe to argue that these troubled relations between the exiles and made efforts for an integrated community of ‘brothers-in-arms’ rather tentative. Norwegian experience conveys evidence here.

Władisław Neuman, the Polish minister notified Halvdan Koht, the Norwegian foreign secretary, of recent developments on 2 October 1939. Since Norway did not send a representative to Angers, the seat of the Polish government-in-exile in France, diplomatic relations were given unilateral character, a formal minimum\(^{14}\). Even so, the Poles made reasonable gains for their Oslo mission was in practice little affected by German pressure. This favourable outcome should be credited to Neuman, serving in Oslo since 1931, allegedly on close terms with the King.\(^{15}\) In line with Allied ministers, he followed the King to northern Norway and eventually into exile.\(^{16}\) However, a standing representative to the Polish government-in-exile was appointed only on 15 November 1940, with the rank of a charge d’affaires\(^{17}\).
Czech and Slovak exiles were also interested in entering (or re-entering, as they saw it\textsuperscript{18}) into diplomatic relations with Norway. However, Koht was guarded. He did not rule out the restoration of bilateral relations, but he took his interlocutors by surprise indicating that this would not imply withdrawal of recognition Norway had granted to the German-dominated state of Slovakia\textsuperscript{19}. Being treated on a par with ‘quislings’ must have shocked Beneš and his associates. Ladislav Szathmáry, a representative-designate who visited Koht on 6 September 1940, needed to resort to minor diplomatic deception plus revoke the memory of Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson, an advocate of the Slovaks against Hungarian oppression at the beginning of the century, so that the issue would be bypassed.\textsuperscript{20} He was appointed as chargé d’affaires ad interim when Norwegian-Czechoslovak relations were restored in October 1940\textsuperscript{21}.

This discussion reveals the hierarchy among ‘little Allies’, i.e. states fighting Axis and not counting to the ‘Big Three’ (Great Britain, Soviet Union, United States). The Norwegians were asked for continuation of diplomatic relations with the Central Europeans rather than the other way around. They perceived the difference in status of the Poles and that of the Czechs and the Slovaks. It is uncertain if Central Europeans drew conclusions. From the ‘little Allies’ point of view, legitimacy and prestige were two sides of the same coin: the former, home and abroad, was a principal foundation of the latter, which in turn buttressed ones interests in communication with the great powers; the other way round, prestige abroad enhanced chances to maintain legitimacy at home. Thus, sensitivity to formalities could take on a spectacular shape. In October 1944, Szathmáry, by then a minister, visited the Secretary-General at the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, Rasmus Skyllstad, and lodged a complaint over an article which had appeared in a periodical published by the Norwegian Information Office on the ground that Czechoslovakia was coined ‘newly created state’. This contested the theory of

\textsuperscript{18} They argued that since none of the ministers had been recalled, bilateral relations were not interrupted; RA, UD 2.21.111, Box 9900, J.No. 28414/43, "Forelegg til statsråd 13. 9. 1940: Utevning for legasjonsråd Smith-Kielland for chargé d’affaires a. i. hos den provisoriske tsjekkoslovakiske regjering".

\textsuperscript{19} Scrutiny does not support Koht’s claim. He recalled lengthy deliberations on the subject, however, the decision came in early April 1940, too late to take effect; JAKUBEC, Pavol – Kotázky uznania Slovenského štátu (Slovenskej republiky) Nórskym kráľovstvom, 1939-1940. Historický časopis. Bratislava: Veda. ISSN 0018-2575. Vol. 61, n., 1 (2013), p. 123-142.


\textsuperscript{21} DCZP, B, sv. 2/1, No. 63, n. 1.
historical continuity which saw its origins in the Kingdom of Bohemia. The actual tug-of-war, Skylstad understood, was Poland’s placement into a different, more senior group.22

A Community, after All?

To win the war was a great power business to which the ‘little Allies’ were able only to lend a hand. Thus, they focused on post-war planning which posed two specific tasks for them: to prepare restoration of the contested statehood they were representing once their countries are liberated and to elaborate most the plausible prospects for security architecture in which their nations could assume appropriate roles so that another major war would be forestalled for a foreseeable future. Not surprisingly, domestic politics took the upper hand – however, foreign affairs did not come short at all.

It was believed that the European arrangement had proven deficient and unstable. From some quarters, criticism of small national states was vocal. They seemed to have been far too weak to organize a reliable defence. Britain saw the necessity for the small nations to come to terms with each other. Political figures as different as Winston Churchill, Hugh Dalton and Aneurin Bevan pronounced regional federalism (possibly a precursor of European unity) to be an option to go for.23 The Central Europeans reacted to these impulses. Some of them had even Pan-European credentials, like Beneš. Sikorski, too, had discussed regional integration with Beneš while in Prague, as an oppositionist, in 1936. He envisaged close, western-orientated cooperation between small powers located between the Baltic and the Black Seas, en passant echoing the designs of his opponents located between the Baltic and the Black Seas.24 Already on 11 November 1940 Beneš and Sikorski, former


Austro-Hungarian nationals both of them, announced the design “to enter as independent and sovereign states into a closer political and economic association, which would become the basis of a new order in Central Europe”. On 19 January 1942 they confirmed the intention to establish a Polish-Czechoslovak confederation. These efforts were to fail for several reasons. However, the main disagreement was about the Soviet Union, before and definitely after it was invaded on 22 June 1941 and joined the Allies: Where Beneš was thinking of co-operation, even alliance, Sikorski aimed at co-existence. Content that Beneš would listen attentively to their wishes, the Soviets, after quite a long period of signalling, issued a veto once they rose to a geopolitical heavyweight in 1943 (and to this effect they used the notorious Katyn Affair). Besides, the Norwegian claim that the main concern was to please the British cannot be ignored.

Federalism and regionalism became a frequent conversation topic among the exiles and it looked like that nations are willing to contemplate integration by agreement, in contrast to one by force and hegemony. The Norwegians were not fond of such speculations. Trygve Lie, then acting foreign secretary, declared a failure of the Scandinavian idea when speaking to the BBC audience on 15 December 1940. At the same time, he expressed Norway’s willingness to associate herself with free sea-faring nations, without sovereignty concessions. Szathmáry communicated the Atlanticist core vision of Norway’s foreign relations in mid-January 1941.

Yet some three weeks later Beneš asked Lie about Norwegian viewpoints regarding the federal
idea in Scandinavia only to be told of the latter’s doubts due to the Swedish position, neutral and Baltic. The Norwegian confirmed that closer ties to Britain were much debated.32

However, London was not only place where exiles were talking foreign policy. Many of them found refuge in Stockholm. The Norwegians constituted the most populous community. Martin Tranmæl, possibly the most influential Norwegian Labour politician of the pre-war era, played the central role33. He and his colleagues (one of them was Willy Brandt, then a Norwegian citizen34) joined the lively international socialist society in its thinking about post-war order35. Operating in a neutral country, the Stockholm emigres’ perspective differed from that of their London-based compatriots. Sweden was the centre of the Nordic federalist debate (despite limited subscription in the higher political echelons)36. No wonder that Tranmæl and his circle were receptive and Nordic-minded37. There, a voluminous pamphlet on the ‘United States of Scandinavia’, published in 194238, evoked discussions. The Nygaardsvold government reacted by issuing The Principal Features of Norway’s Foreign Policy (Hovedlinjer i norsk utenrikspolitikk)39, a confidential, thoroughly debated programmatic statement, in May 1942. In trying to say a definite farewell to neutralist, even isolationist foreign policy thinking, it was acknowledged that “Norway can only achieve security by concerted co-operation with other nations”. At the same time, Norwegian internationalism was directed by-and-large exclusively towards the United Nations and the idea of regional federations was dismissed. The Norwegians still stressed Atlantic, not European ties (contrary to Tranmæl who, aided by Brand and others,

35 On Stockholm Labour exiles, see MISGELD, Die "Internationale Gruppe demokratischer Sozialisten".
issued *Foundations of Discussion about Our Peace Aims* [Diskusjonsgrunnlag om våre fredsmål] in June,\(^\text{40}\)\), probably in the wake of the German-sponsored Neuropa.\(^\text{41}\) In July 1943, Swedish weekly *Vecko-Journalen* brought an interview with British ex-Ambassador to the USSR, Sir Stafford Cripps, inter alia about Scandinavian federation vistas. The diplomat’s sympathetic reaction alarmed the London Norwegians enough to ask the Foreign Office for clarification and to issue a communique saying that Norway did not intend to join any federation.\(^\text{42}\)

The more active role the Soviet Union played in the considerations of Lie and his advisers, the more Norwegian Atlanticism was loosing its momentum in favour of East-West bridge-building.\(^\text{43}\) Welcomed and propagated also by Czechoslovakia,\(^\text{44}\) bridge-building still caused troubles with the Poles. Encouraged by multiple Allied co-operation in post-war policy planning, Sikorski found it timely to go even further. He thought that Poland, the heavyweight of the ‘little Allies’, should assert its position in the long run, too. At the same time, prompted by his confident, Józef Retinger, Sikorski supported ideas of European consciousness and integration.\(^\text{45}\)

Thus, the London Poles tried to break through as a steering element of numerous Inter-Allied initiatives. As the principal adviser to Trygve Lie noted: “The Czechs and the Poles are very interested in the International Assembly Commission … partly because they are interested in binding us all together tight to the European continent”.\(^\text{46}\) It was this continental linkage the London Norwegians were seeking to avoid (whereas, as Nils A. Røhne pointed out, Tranmæl’s inclination towards regional federalism as displayed in *Basic Foundations*, was close to an echo


of the Polish plans”) even at the price of questioning geopolitical subjectivity of Europe as such. Thus, when Sikorski proposed closer consultations on post-war security co-operation among ‘little Allies’, he could only fail with them. The Norwegians concluded that this initiative had a clear anti-Soviet scope. Norway’s participation in schemes potentially disturbing the Soviets was out of question. Lie was anxious about what loose Polish formulations could bring to Norway except for risks of undermining the ties to the great powers. But, as his presence at a luncheon given by Sikorski for the ‘little Allies’ prime ministers and foreign ministers at 14 September 1942 and Norwegian participation in ‘little Allies’ foreign ministers conferences documents, he choose to observe the developments. One cannot rule out that the Norwegians considered the persistent Polish drive an overstretch while Lie himself may have perceived the continental ‘Central Zone’ as competitive to Atlanticism. True, the motif of a barrier which should deter Germany and the Soviet Union at the same time was cultivated by some Polish politicians (and did them lip-service as it enabled the pro-Soviet quarters to denounce all Poles as reactionaries). But Sikorski, mistrustful as he must have been of the country which had joined hands with the Germans in an effort to eradicate Poland, was no Russophobe. His personal stature played an important part in the 1941/42 heyday of Polish-Soviet relations which the Norwegians had possibly not taken much into account. The Katyń affair and the developments following his tragic death (4 July 1943) tended to prove their assessment correct. The two views of the Soviet Union were incompatible.

48 Initially, the Belgians and the Dutch showed more interest; GRASBOIS – L´action, p. 65-66, 70-71.
49 HOLTSMARK – Atlantic Orientation, p. 313.
51 GRASBOIS – L´action, p. 72; POLONSKY – Polish Failure, p. 577-578, 582, 584-585, 586, 590.
52 GAWINECKA-WOŹNIAK, Stosunki, pp. 94-95; HOLTSMARK – Atlantic Orientation, p. 315-318; LIE, Trygve, Hjemover, p. 55. On one occasion Lie allegedly told that the Czechoslovak-Polish talks on post-war co-operation ‘served him as an example’ when he launched the idea of the North-Atlantic regional arrangement, yet this was most likely an act of diplomatic courtesy; Masarykův ústav a Archiv Akademie věd České republiky Prague (MÚÁ), Edvard Beneš, collection II (EB II), Box 464, č.j. 3253/dův/42, inv. č. 3954, sign. 40/110/XVII/Norsko 2, Szathmáry to Beneš, 8 Jul. 1942. I have not found any Norwegian record of this conversation.
54 MATERSKI – Walka, p. 211-319.
**Learning from a small power ally?**

The Soviet-Polish relations, brought at a diplomatic standstill, continued deteriorating after Sikorski´s death. In the same way, the distance between the Norwegians and the Poles was growing. The Norwegian footage on Poland appears to refer to its foreign policy as an example of how *not* to deal with the Soviets. Looking for the right modus operandi, based on a rather modest Norwegian experience, was getting more difficult and important in the final stage of WWII. Soviet enigma had been a source of insecurity among Norwegian exiles for quite some time already. The Poles regularly fuelled unpleasant thoughts, for which they repeatedly earned Lie´s contempt\(^ {55} \) - and they were not alone\(^ {56} \).

Czechoslovakia was in a different position. The Norwegian-Czechoslovak relations were more cordial. The above-mentioned memory of Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson was instrumental in building a symbolic ‘bridge’ and on 8 December 1943 ‘The Czechoslovak-Norwegian Bjørnson Day’ was arranged\(^ {57} \). Albeit President Beneš was rather a complicated figure, his deficits of sociability were more than outweighed by charms of his foreign minister, Jan Masaryk\(^ {58} \). Also some other Czechoslovak personalities (Ladislav Karel Feierabend, Milan Hodža, Štefan Osuský) had friendly contacts with high-profile Norwegians (Anders Fjelstad, Carl Joachim Hambro, Arnold Ræstad) and echoes of goodwill can easily be found on a more ‘grass-root’ level\(^ {59} \).

Czechoslovakia, while no doubt fighting for its place under the Sun in military as well as diplomatic and representative terms, pursued a definitely more ‘small state’ foreign policy than Poland. Still, nothing appears to count more than the simple fact that it ostensibly was in good relations with Moscow: The Soviets were nourishing Beneš´s ‘Munich syndrome’ and building

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\(^{59}\) Scrutiny of *Naše noviny*, a self-published newspaper of the Czechoslovak brigade stationed at Cholmondeley (Cheshire), revealed that no other Western European ‘little ally’ was being presented with frequency and in positive tone comparable to Norway.
a would-be intimate relationship with him. Once Lie had refuted the Polish approach of how to handle the enigmatic great power, a counter-example was needed and the diplomacy of Beneš, though, as the Norwegians knew, heavily questioned by Masaryk, might have fit as a subject for closer analysis. On 13 December 1943 a Czechoslovak-Soviet Alliance Treaty was concluded in Moscow, the first WWII alliance with a great and a small power as contracting parties. Lie did not conceal doubts about Moscow’s intentions with the alliance in private and paid attention to Soviet-Czechoslovak exchanges. It looked probable that the Soviet Union would move westwards and become Norway’s neighbour. Lie found it wise, in a fact-finding conversation with Eden about the Tehran Conference, to allude that Norway might receive an offer to follow Czechoslovakia. Eden played the matter down by pointing out that the question of future sovereignty over Petsamo had not been settled yet which was, at least formally, true.

In 1944 it became necessary to formalize the co-operation with the Soviets on the home ground before the Red Army would get to Norway. This should secure that no ‘Polish’ regime change scenario would occur. The Czechoslovak advice might be of help here. In May 1944, Lie allegedly blamed the Foreign Office for prolonged negotiations about the British-Norwegian Civil Affairs Agreement. A copy of the similar Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of 8 May 1944 was handed over to the Norwegians swiftly. On this occasion Lie told Szathmáry that he had approached the Soviet minister to the exile governments and expressed a wish to conclude a Norwegian-Soviet treaty, to be drafted on the Soviet-Czechoslovak precedent.

As the war was approaching its end, the so-called ‘Polish question’ was culminating. On 4 January 1945 Lie invited Szathmáry to a conversation and asked him about Czechoslovak viewpoints. Since Norway and Czechoslovakia were the only ‘little Allies’ having concluded Civil Affairs Agreements with the Soviets, Lie stated that “quite a lot spoke in favour of some co-ordination … in this matter”. The minister reported enthusiastically: “It is Lies opinion that, for Norway, it is no use wasting time by delaying the recognition of the provisional Lublin


61 [While listening to Beneš] “Lie whispered: Czechoslovakia is going to be the 17th [republic of the USSR]”; NBO, Jakob Stenersen Worm-Müller Papers, Ms. fol. 2653; ‘Dagbøker’ IX, p. 94-95 (entry for 2 Feb. 1944).


63 Still in Allied relations with Poland in March 1943, the Soviets patronized the formation of the Communist-led Union of Polish Patriots (Związek Patriotów Polskich), which eventually evolved into the so-called Lublin Committee; KOCHANSKI – The Eagle Unbowed, p. 343-344, 376-380; WIECZORKIEWICZ – Historia, p. 363-385.
government, especially now when north-eastern Norway is being gradually liberated by bravery of the Red Army” (emphasis added). Szathmáry consulted with Hubert Ripka, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, who, owing to Masaryk’s frequent, sometimes long absence from London, often actually ran the foreign ministry. Afterwards Szathmáry reported that the matter was suspended as long as the Lublin Poles would not accept the pre-Munich frontiers of Czechoslovakia, including Teschen which Poland had seized in October 1938. The Norwegians went on with a wait-and-see policy. Whereas Czechoslovakia recognised the Lublin Poles at the very end of January 1945, Norway postponed the matter was until 5/6 July 1945 with the British in the lead.

These episodes confirmed it once again: When the Norwegians took contact with an Allied small power, they did so because they sought an ad-hoc collaboration while safeguarding good bilateral relationship with a great power. Might closer ties to a small power compromise a relationship with a great power, they were relaxed. Integration of any kind except the United Nations appeared to be no option for a ‘bridge-building’ Norway. Occasionally we find “a Norwegian” involved in federalist deliberations of the European Resistance (Geneva Declaration of 20 March 1944, inspired by Ernesto Rossi and Alfiero Spinelli as an international supplement of the Manifest of Ventotene), yet with a hint of scepticism. Contrary to other occupied nations, there is practically no indication of support for European integration in Norway. True, the principal leader of the Norwegian Resistance, the Chief Justice Paal Berg was an active supporter of the idea in the later 1940s and 1950s, however, his wartime viewpoints are little known.

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A Europe of Nation-States in Miniature

The story sketched here reveals how difficult it was for small European nations, despite a common enemy and a shared meeting-place, to find solid ground for mutual understanding. On the one hand, their representatives learned about each other much more than ever before, which contributed to their enhanced European experience. More comprehensively informed, they could draw lessons from each other’s achievements and misfortunes, which affected their policies. There, wartime London, especially for the Norwegians, was a classroom: Where states, employing past analogies, “draw heavily on their individual experiences [and] pay little attention to those of other states in the same formative event”\(^{69}\), they are more receptive of current developments in the states of the same category. On the other hand, their interests were often specific and diverged more than one could have originally expected. If and when they managed to build a community, it was necessarily a very tentative one. The activities of the exiles were first and foremost directed to the preservation of their threatened nations’ identity. A wider European idea, the message of which to some degree conflated with those of the United Nations and the Free World, found only a limited audience. Seen through the lens of wartime exiles, London was a Europe in miniature, a Europe of nation-states. As far as the three studied representations are concerned, apart from Retinger the atmosphere did not generate a European advocate in line with Paul-Henri Spaak, Johan Willem Beyen, or Robert Schuman\(^{70}\). This appeared to be a rather ominous sign for a European integration project, at least in the foreseeable future. Soon, the paths of the ‘little Allies’ were to take part: while the Poles, the Czechs and the Slovaks, were deprived of a say through integration into ‘Pax Sovietica’, the Norwegians choose to observe the European project with utmost caution\(^{71}\). Even though it might not seem likely, a

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'bridge’ was built between Norway and Czechoslovakia and was to have impact on post-war Norwegian foreign policy. But this is another story.