"Socratic" dialogues

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“SOCRATIC” DIALOGUES

1. General introduction

When one reads the Platonic dialogues, one faces the basic question what exactly Socrates stands for. Does “Socrates”, the main speaker of most of Plato’s dialogues, represent the philosophy of the author or of the latter’s teacher, i.e. himself? The answers, or the ways to answer this question, vary considerably among the scholars, particularly of different traditions. Platonic scholars of our age tend to view some dialogues as Socratic, in the sense that they represent the historical figure of Socrates, or that they represent an earlier stage in Plato’s philosophical views that is faithful to Socrates. According to this view, a certain group of texts is demarcated and called the “Socratic” dialogues, in sharp contrast to the “Platonic” dialogues, which are supposed to contain Plato’s original thinking, e.g. the theory of transcendent Forms, the tripartition of the soul, mathematical education, and the political idea of the “philosopher-king”.¹ On the other hand, there are scholars who deny the separation of the two groups and see in all the dialogues nothing other than Plato’s own philosophy. The appellation “Socratic dialogues” appears in titles of monographs and articles, but each scholar uses it in his or her own way, and includes a different set of dialogues in the list of the “Socratic” dialogues.² Yet, interpretative assumptions underlie all delineations of so-called “Socratic dialogues”.

In this review a team of five researchers from different linguistic and scholarly

¹ However, of these ideas, some are occasionally deemed Socratic. For example, Malcolm Schofield argues that the “philosopher-king” is a development of Socrates’ philosophy, not original to Plato, cf. Schofield (2006), 29, cf. 19: “The echoes of the *Apology* suggest that Plato has reached these conclusions not (as the *Seventh Letter* implies) by reflecting on his own experience of politics, but by rethinking Socrates’ relationship to Athens”.

² A standard list is given in Vlastos (1991), 47, n.8, but there are several problems of inclusion/exclusion; see Annas (2002), 17, n.1. Controversial dialogues are the *Gorgias*, *Meno*, and *Euthydemus*, in particular.

backgrounds collaborates and examines the issue: Noburu Notomi (Tokyo, chief reviewer), Mauro Bonazzi (Milano), Marcel van Ackeren (Köln), Louis-André Dorion (Montreal), and Tomoko Hatano (Tokyo). We focus in particular on the following questions treated in the recent literature:

- i) What are the “Socratic” dialogues? What does this designation mean?
- ii) How do we know what we think we know about the historic Socrates (the so-called “Socratic problem”)?
- iii) Where (or in which dialogues) is the historical Socrates in evidence, if anywhere, particularly in relation to the chronological division of Plato’s dialogues?
- iv) What philosophical ideas or roles can be attributed to Socrates in Plato? (e.g. intellectualism, unity of virtues, hedonism, denial of *akrasia*, disavowal of knowledge, etc.)
- v) What are the core ideas in recent studies on Socrates and the Socratics?
- vi) Why are some scholars not interested in this question at all?

The issue of the “Socratic” dialogues is closely related to three topics in Platonic studies: (1) the so-called “Socratic problem”, (2) the dialogue form, and (3) the chronology of Plato’s works. First, the famous “Socratic problem” -- whether and how it is possible to reconstruct the historical Socrates out of Plato’s dialogues -- frames our contribution, since those who tend to name certain dialogues “Socratic” rely on their answer to this question. In the next section we briefly look at the recent renaissance of the *Socratic literature*, which sheds new light on this issue. Second, since the author Plato never speaks nor appears in the dialogues, the question of Socrates’ role is essentially related to the recent debate on the “dialogue form” of Plato’s philosophy.³ Therefore, reviewing the scholarly works on “Socratic” dialogues entails considering what role Socrates plays in Plato’s *dialogues*. The third related topic is how to distinguish, if possible, different stages of Plato’s philosophy: did he change or develop his thinking? The

³ The recent scholarship is summarized and discussed by Christopher Gill (2002), (2006).

division and chronology of Plato's dialogues, especially the controversy between unitarian or developmentalist views, are popular subjects in Platonic studies; those who isolate “Socratic” dialogues start from a certain kind of developmentalism.

We try to answer some of the above questions in this review, but we plan to continue our review project. Its aim is not simply to introduce recent research, but to raise questions and widen the perspectives, and thereby to stimulate arguments on this important subject. For example, if we classify some short and aporetic dialogues, such as the *Euthyphro*, *Lysis*, *Charmides*, and *Laches*, as “Socratic”, we have to confront difficulties with some other dialogues that have Socrates as the main speaker, such as the *Theaetetus* and *Philebus*. So in sections 5 and 6, we focus on two problematic dialogues, *Gorgias* and *Theaetetus*. As a product of international collaboration, and in keeping with the pluralism in our field, the review is presented in three languages. Given that this review project is intended to stimulate further debates, the review team would appreciate any comments on our review (please send comments to: notomi@z8.keio.jp).

2. New perspectives on the *Socratic dialogues*

Since the topic of “Socratic dialogues” cannot be discussed without facing the so-called “Socratic problem”, let us first look at the recent renaissance of the *Socratic literature*.

The “Socratic problem” deals with four authors, namely Aristophanes, Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle, who are historical witnesses to Socrates’ philosophy. However, the sources other than Plato were mostly neglected in the twentieth century, from the beginning of the century when Karl Joël, A.E. Taylor and others severely rejected the evidential value of Xenophon’s testimony, up until the last

few decades.⁴ In particular, many scholars of the English-speaking and analytical tradition treated Plato as the only source for the historical Socrates, and ignored the views, held by scholars such as Olof Gigon and several others, that rejected the possibility of discovering the historical Socrates in Plato’s works. But the recent revivals of Xenophon (in English, for example, by Vivienne Gray and Donald Morrison) -- with the new Budé edition of the *Memorabilia* (text and commentary by Michele Bandini and Louis-André Dorion, first volume 2003, subsequent volumes forthcoming) --, and of the notion of *Socratic literature* in general, drastically change the scope of our discussion.

Since Gabriele Giannantoni produced his *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae* in 1990, scholars have increasingly recognized the importance of the study. Plato was not the only author who wrote dialogues featuring Socrates; the other pupils of Socrates, such as Antisthenes, Aeschines, Phaedo, Xenophon, and Euclides, produced many Socratic dialogues, of which four survive and many testimonies remain. Giannantoni’s edition provides the scholars with a full collection of the relevant testimonies. Those works produced by the Socratics were called “Socratic literature” (*Sôkratikoî logoi*) or “Socratic dialogues” (*Sôkratikoî dialogoi*) in antiquity, and all Plato’s dialogues are naturally included in this genre and deemed *Socratic*.⁵ In English, Charles Kahn draws due attention to this aspect in the first chapter of his *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue*.⁶ A few collections of essays on the Socratics came out recently, of which the proceedings of the Socratics meeting in

⁴ For the reception of Xenophon’s testimony, see Dorion, (2003), vii-xviii. On the other hand, we should remember that scholars in Italy, Germany, and France have continuously contributed to this field; to mention a few, Gabriele Giannantoni, Livio Rossetti, Fernanda Decleva Caizzi, Aldo Brancacci, Michel Narcy, Andreas Patzer, and Klaus Döring. Also the works on Socrates by Nicholas Smith and Thomas Brickhouse must be mentioned as important contributions in English. The recent change concerning the Socratic problem in the English literature is seen, for example, in Nails (2005).

⁵ In this sense, calling Plato’s earlier works “Socratic dialogues” is a purely modern custom, as shown in Taylor (2002); see section 4 below.

⁶ Cf. Kahn (1996), “*Sôkratikoî logoi*: the literary and intellectual background of Plato’s work”; see also Clay (1994).

Senigallia in 2005 deserves special mention⁷; several essays in the volume are directly or indirectly concerned with Plato’s dialogues. This new approach illuminates some aspects of Socrates’ philosophy presented in Plato (in combination with the other Socratic writers), such as his views on religion.⁸

Moreover, the wider perspective in the treatment of the Platonic dialogues sheds new light on some works that have been neglected as “spurious” since the nineteenth century. In discussing the *Clitophon*, Siem Slings mentions the possibility of its intertextual nature within the *Socratic literature*.⁹ Also, the *Theages* has been examined afresh in relation to the other *Socratic dialogues*.¹⁰ Even if these dialogues were not written by Plato himself, the examination of them will contribute much to the study of Plato’s philosophy, by illuminating the literary and philosophical contexts of the *Socratic dialogues*.¹¹

3. Socrates in German scholarship

Of the recent works written in German, the following deserve special mention: Pleger (1996); Patzer (1984, 2000); Döring (1987, 1998); Figal (1995); Erler (1987, 2006, 2007); Heitsch (2002/2004, 2002, 2003, 2004). It is noticeable that all of them respond, in one way or another, to the thesis of Olof Gigon, who examines the general features of the *Socratic literature* (outside Plato) and suggests that all Plato’s dialogues should also be taken as literary fiction, rather than a

⁷ Cf. Rossetti & Stavru (2007); the conference was held in Senigallia, Italy, in 2005. In addition to the Senigallia meeting, a series of meetings on the Socratics were held in Aix-en-Provence in 2003 (Proceedings appeared in 2008), in Palermo in 2006 (Proceedings appeared in 2007), and in Napoli in 2008.

⁸ See the articles collected in Destrée & Smith (2005). McPherran (1996), a forerunner on this subject, basically takes the methodological assumption of Vlastos (1991), while he suggests that Aristotle represents Socrates with the *Socratic literature* also in view.

⁹ Cf. Slings (1999): “The *Clitophon* is essentially a condemnation not of Socrates, nor of another philosopher, but of a specific branch of Socratic literature, to wit philosophical protreptic in its Pre-Aristotelian, ethical form” (8).

¹⁰ Cf. Döring (2004) examines its relation to Aeschines, in 29, 47-48, 51, and 80-81.

¹¹ Cf. Döring, Erler & Schorn (2005).

historically accurate representation or portrait of Socrates. Whereas most of the English speaking scholars, following Gregory Vlastos, totally ignore this thesis and keep occupying themselves with separating (a historical) Socrates from Plato within the Platonic dialogues, the German scholars who discuss Plato consciously situate themselves in relation to Gigon's thesis.

Wolfgang Pleger takes the most “Socratic” approach to Plato's dialogues. Pleger believes that from the *Sôkratikoî logoi* in general and especially from the Platonic dialogues we can draw a portrait of the historical Socrates. Thus, he argues against the position taken by Charles Kahn, who systematically weaves the dialogues into Plato's philosophy.¹²

Andreas Patzer holds a middle-ground position concerning the figure of Socrates in the early and middle dialogues: the philosophy of the historical Socrates can be seen most clearly in the *Apology*. He supposes that the *Apology* unfolds the thought-horizon of Socratic philosophy, from which Platonic thinking takes a starting point.¹³ In this work we can detect how Socrates actually thought and how Plato's philosophy came into being out of Socratic thinking.¹⁴

Klaus Döring, who has done substantial work on the *Socratic literature*, takes a similar approach. He argues that the picture of Socrates of the *Apology* is authentic in its characteristics.¹⁵ For Döring the *Apology* constitutes the crucial criterion by which to judge the figure of Socrates in the early and middle dialogues. He posits the principle that only the statements that are in line with the *Apology* should be regarded as authentic. This view is also supported by his

¹² Cf. Kahn (1996).

¹³ Cf. Patzer (2000), 58: “daß die Apologie den Denkhorizont des sokratischen Philosophierens beschreibt, von dem das Platonische Denken seinen Ausgang genommen hat”.

¹⁴ Cf. Patzer (2000), 66: “Wenn irgendwo, so erfahren wir hier, wie Sokrates in Wirklichkeit dachte und wie aus dem Sokratischen Denken die Platonische Philosophie entstehen konnte”.

¹⁵ Cf. Döring (1998), 156: “daß das Sokratesbild der Apologie in seinen Grundzügen authentisch ist”

examination of the Socratic Aeschines.¹⁶

A more skeptical position is taken by Michael Erler. Erler's claim largely follows the fictionality thesis. He sees in the figure of Socrates the formation of the ideal Platonic proto-philosopher (“idealen platonischen Protophilosophen”).¹⁷ Erler is not so radical as Gigon, since he maintains that the idealization and fictional elements do not exclude historicity,¹⁸ but he sees in Plato's figure of Socrates a historical core (“historischen Kern”).¹⁹ This well-thought position is opposed to Vlastos', which is based on the developmentalist model, with which Erler has no more sympathy than the Tübingen school.

Günter Figal also argues against Vlastos' thesis. He raises an important objection to the distinction between the authentic Socrates in the early dialogues and the Platonic figure in the later dialogues; he insists that the Socrates in the former is much more Platonic than Vlastos believes.²⁰ He proposes that the early dialogues already contain the topics and questions discussed in the later dialogues, which Vlastos takes as typically Platonic but not Socratic.²¹ Figal, however, still sees “another difficulty of investigation, i.e. with obtaining a convincing picture of Socrates on the basis of the early dialogues alone. One cannot deny that some of the middle dialogues draw a far more plastic, far more lively, and thus much more accurate picture. ... Why should Plato have drawn such a picture in contexts in which he could have advanced his original philosophy on his own?”²² These

¹⁶ Cf. Döring (1984), esp. the concluding remarks in 29-30.

¹⁷ Cf. Erler (2007), 83.

¹⁸ Cf. Erler (2007), 83: “Idealisierung und fiktive Elemente schliessen Historisches nicht aus”.

¹⁹ Cf. Erler (2006), 50.

²⁰ Cf. Figal (1995), 19: “viel platonischer [ist] als Vlastos glaubt”.

²¹ Cf. Figal (1995), 19: “Zwar sind die frühen Dialoge wirklich auf Sokrates konzentriert; doch nehmen die späteren Dialoge nicht nur Themen der früheren auf, sondern die früheren enthalten auch schon Themen und Fragestellungen, die Vlastos als typisch platonisch und entsprechend als unsokratisch versteht”.

²² Cf. Figal (1995), 20: er sieht jedoch noch “eine andere Schwierigkeit des Versuchs, allein aus Platons frühen Dialogen ein überzeugendes Sokrates-Bild zu gewinnen. Man kann nämlich nicht gut bestreiten, das einige der mittleren Dialoge ein sehr viel plastischeres, sehr viel

objections are raised in a manner that resembles Helmut Kuhn’s approach. Kuhn for his part has argued against the conclusion of Heinrich Maier, who also locates the authentic representation of Socrates in the earlier dialogues.²³

Of the series of publications mentioned above, Ernst Heitsch argues, against the *opinio communis*,²⁴ that Plato had written already two dialogues by the time of the trial and death of Socrates in 399 BC: namely the *Ion* and *Hippias Minor*.²⁵ He thereby renews the controversy over the chronology of Plato’s dialogues and the question whether we can firmly establish the order of dialogues (early / middle / late). Whereas Anglo-American scholars share the increasing doubt as to whether this question can be answered at all,²⁶ Heitsch tries to justify the very strong assumption that there is an independent fourth group of dialogues that precede the “normal” early dialogues. Heitsch’s overall argument runs as follows:

- i) In later works Plato distinguishes between two types of conversation: one is simply playful and purely eristic, and the other pursues a serious goal. In the latter, Socrates not only teaches some positive doctrines but also actualizes the care for the soul of his interlocutors by discussing some important problems and seeking to achieve the truth in joint inquiry.²⁷
- ii) The two early dialogues, the *Ion* and *Hippias Minor*, have Socrates engaged in the first type of conversation.
- iii) Therefore, these dialogues must have been written before the trial of Socrates, because in his defense Socrates admits and acknowledges that his manner of conversing with others (i.e. through demonstrating that renowned people only

lebensvolleres und derart auch genaueres Bild zeichnen. [...] Warum sollte Platon ein solches Bild gerade dort zeichnen, wo es ihm doch angeblich nurmehr um die eigene Philosophie geht?”

²³ Cf. Maier (1913) and Kuhn (1934).

²⁴ Cf. Guthrie (1975), 54-56. However, it was common for nineteenth century German scholars, such as Schleiermacher, Hermann, and Ast, to regard the earliest dialogues of Plato as written in Socrates’ lifetime; see Taylor (2002), 75-78.

²⁵ Cf. Heitsch (2002/2004), (2002), (2003), (2004).

²⁶ Cf. Kahn (1996), 42-48, Annas (2002); see the next section.

²⁷ See e.g. *Tht.* 167d-168c, *Rep.* 537e-539c; cf. Heitsch (2004), 15-6.

possess an illusion of knowing something important) made others feel threatened. Heitsch infers that Socrates thus knew that he became a “victim of his divine task”.²⁸ He furthermore identifies the discussions to which Socrates refers in *Ap.* 23c, 39c-d as the two dialogues *Ion* and *Hippias Minor*.²⁹ The Socrates of the two dialogues is fooling around with his interlocutors.³⁰ The young author Plato admired the argumentation-skills of his master and was tempted to use satirical elements in his compositions, but it is unlikely that Plato wrote these dialogues after the death of Socrates, for only “before 399, those kinds of jokes could have been regarded as harmless”.³¹

iv) Heitsch supports his thesis with the evidence that the terms “care / to take care” (*epimeleia* / *epimeleisthai*) are not used in the two dialogues whereas they frequently appear in the dialogues written after the trial.³²

In Heitsch’s reading of the two dialogues, the second point (ii) is the keystone of his argumentation. He pays careful attention to the style of argumentation but claims that one cannot find arguments beyond the mere use of hilarious or even vicious fallacies, e.g. equivocations in order to justify some perverted theses like the one at the end of the *Hippias Minor*.

Although a more differentiated notion of Plato’s evolution as author and philosopher may prove to be necessary and useful in the long run, it is precisely this crucial point of Heitsch’s argument which one might examine more critically. Recent studies show that both dialogues may in fact, and contrary to Heitsch’s claim, contain some serious and positive doctrines. (a) In the *Ion* Plato develops his own notion of *technê* and uses it against the sophistic claim of *polymathia*,³³ which the rhapsode Ion represents. (b) In particular the argument in the *Hippias*

²⁸ Cf. Heitsch (2004), 17, with reference to *Ap.* 23b and 29d-30c.

²⁹ Cf. Heitsch (2002), 183.

³⁰ Cf. Heitsch (2002/2004), 186.

³¹ Cf. Heitsch (2004), 18.

³² Cf. Heitsch (2002), 187-189.

³³ Cf. van Ackeren (2003), 36-40, (2009).

Minor may be less eristic.³⁴ On its final thesis, Heitsch just follows Wilamowitz’s old assumption of its amorality, but the claim can be read as an early version of the Socratic paradox about the involuntariness of wrongdoing.³⁵ It is true that in both dialogues Socrates does not display much care for the soul of his interlocutors. But first, his treatment of other interlocutors, such as Euthydemus, Dionysodoros, and Polos, is not much different. And second, both dialogues contain positive doctrines that perfectly match with later Socratic-Platonic theories. In spite of these questions, though, Heitsch’s arguments stimulate our reading of the early “Socratic” dialogues from a fresh perspective.

4. Recent challenges in English scholarship

In the English-speaking world, the chronological division of Plato’s dialogues, which appears to have been firmly established, has begun to receive severe criticisms from some of the leading scholars. The collection of papers presented to the colloquium at the Center for Hellenic Studies, Washinton D.C. in 1999, entitled “Plato and Socrates: Approaches to the Interpretation of the Platonic Dialogues?”, raises and tackles several important issues. The editors, Julia Annas and Christopher Rowe, state their aims as follows: “The first of these changes is the rapidly increasing breakdown of the long-accepted paradigm for interpreting Plato which rests on a broad division of the dialogues into “early” (and “Socratic”), “middle”, and “late”. There is growing disaffection with many of the assumptions that sustain this paradigm, such as our ability to isolate a “Socratic” phase of Plato’s thought, or the usefulness of the chronology of composition to establish the development of that thought.”³⁶

³⁴ Cf. Weiss (1992).

³⁵ Cf. van Ackeren (2003), 54-64.

³⁶ Cf. Annas & Rowe (2002), ix. In addition to Chs.1 (Annas), 3 (Taylor), and 6 (Penner), the other chapters, i.e. 4 (Kahn), 5 (Gill), and 7 (Nightingale), are also related in some ways to the issue of characterization of the “Socratic” dialogues; see the editors’ introduction in x-xi.

In the first chapter, Annas shakes the grounds for the separation of “Middle” dialogues from the “Early” and “Late” ones.³⁷ The arguments which Annas presents are worth careful examination, but we should bear in mind that the criteria for the two distinctions, “Early-Middle” and “Middle-Late”, are of a different nature: while the latter is normally presented on the basis of stylometric tests, the former is based mostly on the interpretations (or impressions) of scholars: short/long, aporetic/doctrinal, and “Socratic/Platonic”.³⁸ Although it may seem difficult to imagine how one can discuss Plato without some sort of division or grouping of the dialogues,³⁹ Annas’ argument raises a serious doubt about our naïve distinction between the “Socratic” and “Platonic” phases.

Christopher Taylor in Chapter 3 traces the “origins of our present paradigms” by examining the questions: “When, and precisely why, did “Socrates” begin to be separated off from “Plato” in the interpretation of Plato? Who invented the notion that one group of dialogues is essentially Socratic, and why?”⁴⁰ He demonstrates that the search for the historical Socrates started with nineteenth century German scholars, and that the growing interest in identifying the authentically Socratic features in some dialogues is represented by major scholars of our age, e.g. W.K.C. Guthrie, Gregory Vlastos, and Terence Irwin. Taylor’s survey invites us, Plato scholars, to recognize the historical nature of our questions and framework of research, although this does not entail that our present scheme is *wrong* or that the “Socratic question” is meaningless.⁴¹

³⁷ This is based on the historical survey of the Middle Platonists’ reading of Plato, in Annas (1999).

³⁸ Cf. Annas (2002), 2-8; she focuses on the “*ad hominem*” argument. The relation between the scientific results of stylometry and the (distorted) division of the dialogues into three periods is examined in Kahn (2002).

³⁹ Frede (2002) shows a traditional reaction to Annas.

⁴⁰ Cf. Taylor (2002), 73.

⁴¹ Mario Montuori investigates in a different perspective the change of views on “Socrates” from the early modern period to the present: cf. Montuori (1998). He shows that many discussions on Socrates come from a special concern to defend “the just man condemned”.

Christopher Rowe, in commenting on Terry Penner, “The Historical Socrates and Plato’s Early Dialogues: Some Philosophical Questions” (Chapter 6), admits that Penner’s presentation of Socrates makes sense of many of Plato’s texts, but he nevertheless expresses hesitation to accept the clear opposition between the “real, historical” Socrates and Plato. The discovery of the “historical Socrates” by Penner is, as Rowe puts it, not his main objective, but “an accidental outcome” of interpreting different or incompatible views within Plato’s dialogues.⁴² Penner is one of those who firmly maintain the clear difference between the philosophy of the historical Socrates in the “Socratic” dialogues and the genuinely Platonic philosophy in the middle dialogues.⁴³ So it is interesting that Rowe and Penner have collaborated on a philosophical commentary on the *Lysis* of 2005.

Penner and Rowe’s *Plato’s Lysis* sees this dialogue as providing a systematic and coherent account of a special theory about human desire and action, which is fundamental to the whole range of the other Platonic dialogues. An entire web of interlocking claims is involved in the argument of the *Lysis*, about knowledge, desire, love, and the good.⁴⁴ They identify the “first friend” -- the sole ultimate good sought in all love or friendship and all desire -- as a certain knowledge or wisdom. Both love (friendship) and being in love will be identified as species of that desire for good. The desire for good -- especially when seen in its generalized form -- will turn out to be the origin of all voluntary action whatever, and to be identical with the desire for the agent’s own good.⁴⁵

They regard the basic Socratic and Platonic positions as nearly identical, and seem to identify Socrates (in the dialogue and historical) with Plato, except that

⁴² Cf. Rowe (2002), 215. In this sense, Penner’s (philosophical) concern may be essentially different from the others’ (historical) one, e.g. of Vlastos.

⁴³ Besides Penner (2002), he engages in this project in Penner (1992) and (2006); however, Penner (1992) looks more confident in the distinction and separation of the “Socratic dialogues”.

⁴⁴ Cf. Penner & Rowe (2005), 196-197.

⁴⁵ Cf. Penner & Rowe (2005), 216-230.

Socrates is fundamentally at odds with Plato over the implications of a single issue, namely, “psychology of action”.⁴⁶ This is the question of whether it is possible for any actions to be a direct result merely of irrational desires taken together with certain beliefs. In the Platonic “parts of the soul” doctrine, such actions as Aristotle calls “voluntary” or “willing” can be brought about by brute irrational desires. For Socrates, however, the only desire that can ever function is desire for a single ultimate good, consisting in the agent’s own maximum available happiness.⁴⁷

In his own monograph, *Plato and the Art of Philosophical Writing*,⁴⁸ Christopher Rowe, esp. in “Preliminaries: reading Plato”, proposes a new perspective on reading Plato’s dialogues, with a critical assessment of the traditional approaches. Plato’s aim in writing the dialogues is to persuade readers, including us, so as to turn their souls and lead them out of the cave by means of philosophical rhetoric (i.e. written dialogues).⁴⁹ Rowe distances himself from both the developmentalist (or sceptical) and the unitarian (or doctrinalist) readings, but often shows more sympathy with the latter.⁵⁰ While his reading is presented as neutral to the chronology, he keeps the traditional division of the dialogues into three groups,⁵¹ and uses the customary label of the “Socratic” dialogues (with quotes; though he prefers the other term “pre-*Republic*” dialogues).⁵² The relationship between the pre-*Republic* dialogues and the *Republic* is, however, the reverse of that proposed

⁴⁶ Penner and Rowe present Socrates and Plato as a set, as it were, so do they show themselves, expressing the first person plural we as “Penner and Rowe” with parentheses : see Penner & Rowe (2005), 195, n.1. They leave it open whether “Socrates” is historical; see 195, n.2 and 63, n.48 (with reference to Penner (2002) & Rowe (2002)).

⁴⁷ Cf. Penner & Rowe (2005), 195, n.2., 227.

⁴⁸ Rowe (2007). The critical survey of the issues and the basic direction of his argument is given in Rowe (2006).

⁴⁹ Cf. Rowe (2007), vii, 12 (“unsettle the reader”), 22 (“our, the reader’s, improvement”), 30, 63 (turning us round, out of the cave).

⁵⁰ Cf. Rowe (2007), 4,n.7, 42 (sympathy with the unitarian interpretation).

⁵¹ Cf. Rowe (2007), vii-viii, 42, 48.

⁵² For the “Socratic” dialogues, see Rowe (2007), 4, 27,n.75, 29, and “Interlude: a schedule of the genuine dialogues” (198-199); for “pre-*Republic*”, see 29, 35.n.109.

by Charles Kahn, who regards the former as proleptic to, or anticipations of, the latter.⁵³ For Rowe, by contrast, the *Republic* (to which much of the monograph is devoted) is basically a development of Socrates’ intellectualism concerning the good, presented in the “Socratic” dialogues, particularly the *Lysis*.⁵⁴

One of the most distinctive features of Rowe’s reading is a clear and firm identification of the “Socrates” of the dialogues with the author Plato;⁵⁵ he calls Socrates Plato’s “*alter ego*, his *persona*, his mask”.⁵⁶ Plato remains *Socratic* throughout his philosophical career.⁵⁷ In this sense, Rowe’s position opposes the literary interpretation that neutralizes the author’s position,⁵⁸ as well as the developmentalist view. He sees the essential continuity of Socrates’ and Plato’s philosophy from the first group, especially the *Apology*, in which Socrates declares his ignorance, to the *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and *Theatetus*.⁵⁹ Just as the Socrates of the “Socratic” dialogues claims himself to know nothing in comparison with the god, Plato himself must be in the epistemological state of ignorance. Although Plato mentions some superior (or ideal) philosophers as philosopher-kings in the *Republic*, he still believes that human beings cannot attain full (divine) knowledge.⁶⁰ However, Socrates himself does not experience *aporia* in his conversations with others; his interlocutors are subject to *aporia*,⁶¹ while Socrates holds firmly on to the view that excellence is knowledge of good and bad. In this sense the inquiry in the “Socratic” dialogues is not as open-ended as is usually assumed; it is more in later dialogues that Socrates conducts an open

⁵³ Cf. Kahn (1996).

⁵⁴ Cf. Penner and Rowe (2005).

⁵⁵ For this reason, Rowe is critical of Aristotle’s report, in Rowe (2007), 47-48. Also, Rowe (2002), 216-220, critically examines “Aristotle’s evidence”.

⁵⁶ Cf. Rowe (2007), viii; see also 2, 15 (“*portavoce*, his mouthpiece”), and 19.

⁵⁷ Cf. Rowe (2007), 29, 39, etc.

⁵⁸ Cf. Rowe (2007), 32.

⁵⁹ On the other hand, the reason why Plato uses the other figures in the later dialogues (Parmenides, the Eleatic visitor, Timaeus, and the Athenian visitor) is explained in terms of authority of different kinds. Timaeus is discussed in ch.10.

⁶⁰ Cf. Rowe (2007), ch.7.

⁶¹ Cf. Rowe (2007), 24, 196 (*Rep.* I).

investigation.⁶²

There are two ordinary assumptions that resist this continuity of “Socrates” in the two groups (“early/middle”): first, that the Forms, introduced in the “middle” dialogues, are Plato’s original thought, which we cannot attribute to Socrates,⁶³ and second, that Plato changes the representation of the soul from the strictly intellectualist (Socratic) view to the more complex psychology of the tripartite soul.⁶⁴ Rowe argues that Plato presents the division of the soul in *Republic* IV and VIII-IX only for contextual reasons, whereas in Book X he returns to the true view, which is similar to that of the *Phaedo*. Thus, the “Socratic” dialogues are not “work in progress”, that is, a preliminary stage to the fuller philosophical arguments (of the middle and later dialogues).⁶⁵ Nor is Socrates merely clearing the way, by unmasking wrong beliefs.⁶⁶ He holds a “coherent nexus of ideas”, which can rightly be called Platonism.⁶⁷

Although Rowe still uses the common appellation “Socratic dialogues” (with quotes), he does not attribute any special significance to the issue of the historical Socrates. It may have been better to avoid this common label altogether, lest the readers misunderstand his position on this issue. Yet, his attempt to read the dialogues together challenges modern interpretations of Plato, particularly those concerning the relationship between Socrates and the author of the dialogues.

⁶² Cf. Rowe (2007), 237.

⁶³ To which Rowe gives counter-arguments, in Rowe (2007), 39-49, 109-121.

⁶⁴ Cf. Rowe (2007), 18 (*akrasia* problem), 48-49; he treats this issue in chs.4 and 5.

⁶⁵ Cf. Rowe (2007), 28, n.82.

⁶⁶ Rowe rejects the view that *Sph.* 230b-d represents Socrates, in Rowe (2007), 21, n.58, 36, n.117, and 131. He emphasizes “questioning” more than the ordinary “elenchus”, in 7-8, 24.

⁶⁷ Cf. Rowe (2007), 28, n.82.

5. Recent works on the *Gorgias*

Il carattere problematico della nozione di “Socratic dialogue” emerge con chiarezza nel *Gorgia*. Gregory Vlastos, per nominare uno dei più autorevoli studiosi del ‘Socrate platonico’ aveva usato questo dialogo come testimonianza attendibile per il pensiero del Socrate storico. Studi più recenti, in particolare quelli di Alessandra Fussi⁶⁸ e Devin Stauffner,⁶⁹ procedono invece in una direzione opposta, insistendo sul carattere platonico delle argomentazioni contenute nel dialogo. Di fatto, ognuno a modo proprio, entrambi gli autori si riconoscono nel cosiddetto “dialogical approach”, vale a dire la convinzione che in Platone forma e contenuto non possono essere separate: per una comprensione adeguata dei dialoghi platonici «l’analisi del tessuto drammatico» deve assumere «una condizione di dignità pari a quella delle argomentazioni tecnicamente riconosciute come ‘filosofiche’».⁷⁰ Nel seguito di questa nota ci concentreremo principalmente sul libro della Fussi, riservando ad una prossima occasione l’analisi del volume di Stauffner. L’importanza di questa metodologia emerge con chiarezza a proposito del tema principale discusso nel *Gorgia*, vale a dire il problema della retorica e della sua presunta opposizione con la filosofia. Gregory Vlastos aveva affermato che Socrate, nella misura in cui è l’eroe filosofico di Platone e un modello di onestà intellettuale, non può mentire o ingannare i suoi interlocutori: e visto che a più riprese critica la retorica, questo significa che non ne fa alcun uso.⁷¹ Ma un’analisi dettagliata delle argomentazioni del *Gorgia* mostra invece che anche le argomentazioni di Socrate contengono numerosi spunti retorici, come si ricava ad esempio dal fatto che Socrate attribuisce a Gorgia concetti e tesi che Gorgia non aveva espresso.⁷² Socrate, insomma, in molti passaggi si rivela molto più vicino di quanto potremmo credere alle pratiche

⁶⁸ Cf. Fussi (2006).

⁶⁹ Cf. Stauffner (2006).

⁷⁰ Cf. Fussi (2006), 10-11.

⁷¹ Cf. Vlastos (1991), in particolare il capitolo “Does Socrates Cheat?”, pp. 132-156.

⁷² Cf. Fussi (2006), 131-182.

argomentative di retori e sofisti (l'analisi della confutazione di Gorgia, e dei suoi limiti, è una delle parti più interessanti dello studio della Fussi).

Dalle analisi della Fussi si possono ricavare almeno due conclusioni. La prima osservazione riguarda Socrate. L'analisi attenta del dialogo mostra che non sarebbe corretto sfruttare le affermazioni del personaggio Socrate per ricostruire le posizioni storiche del filosofo ateniese Socrate: Socrate è prima di tutto un personaggio dialogico. La seconda riguarda la posizione di Platone (e del *Gorgia* più specificamente) rispetto alla retorica. Leggere il *Gorgia* nei termini di una opposizione tra retorica e filosofia è riduttivo, perché le argomentazioni della filosofia hanno spesso bisogno della forza persuasiva della retorica; il problema è dunque la costruzione di un'alleanza tra queste due discipline – un problema molto complesso, che avrebbe impegnato a lungo Platone (si pensi ad esempio al *Fedro*): la filosofia si presenta come una pratica di vita contrapposta all'adulazione [*i.e.* la retorica tradizionale], ma questo non significa che essa a sua volta non possieda anche un intento persuasivo.⁷³ Più concretamente ancora, il *Gorgia* costituisce proprio un esempio concreto di retorica filosofica.⁷⁴

Ma da queste osservazioni nasce un altro problema, ancora più delicato: la convergenza tra le tesi del personaggio Socrate e Platone. Socrate è indubbiamente il personaggio principale del dialogo, a cui vanno le simpatie di Platone. Tuttavia, secondo la Fussi, questo non significa automaticamente che le sue tesi rispecchino fedelmente le convinzioni di Platone. Al contrario, sarebbe possibile ricavare che c'è una discrepanza tra il personaggio Socrate e Platone.⁷⁵ Questo perché Socrate nel corso del dialogo risulterebbe abile solo nelle argomentazioni razionali senza dimostrarsi in possesso della capacità di persuasione che deriva dalla retorica.⁷⁶ Socrate, insomma, identifica la filosofia con

⁷³ Cf. Fussi (2006), 127.

⁷⁴ Cf. Fussi (2006), 53.

⁷⁵ Cf. Fussi (2006), 69.

⁷⁶ Cfr. ad es. Fussi (2006), 171-182.

una tecnica come la medicina, senza capire, come aveva osservato Gorgia, che la medicina senza retorica è debole (456b1-5): il medico possiede le conoscenze, ma senza l'aiuto del retore non è in grado di convincere i suoi pazienti.⁷⁷ Secondo la Fussi è in questa frase di Gorgia, che sottolinea l'importanza dell'alleanza tra tecniche come la medicina (e la filosofia) con la retorica, che si raccoglie la tesi di fondo di Platone. E nella misura in cui privilegia solo le competenze tecniche e razionali, Socrate si distanzia da Platone.

Per quanto interessante e stimolante, non sono completamente d'accordo sulla legittimità di questa tesi sulla divergenza tra il personaggio Socrate e l'autore del dialogo Platone. E questo per due ragioni. Un primo problema riguarda la figura di Gorgia, che ha uno statuto ambiguo nella interpretazione della Fussi: da un lato Gorgia, pur essendo migliore di Polo e Callicle, non è certo un personaggio positivo e viene infatti confutato da Socrate non solo per le debolezze teoriche ma anche per alcuni limiti personali (ad esempio la vanità); dall'altro lato, però, secondo la Fussi, è proprio a Gorgia e non a Socrate che andrebbe attribuito il concetto più importante di tutto il dialogo (il già menzionato passo di 456b1-5, dove afferma che la medicina e la retorica sono complementari). In sé non è impossibile che Gorgia, nonostante i suoi limiti, esponga una tesi decisiva. Ma questa proposta non è a mio parere del tutto convincente: la frase di Gorgia è sicuramente importante, ma questo non esclude che un esempio concreto della necessità di questa alleanza tra retorica e filosofia si trovi proprio nel personaggio di Socrate. E questo ci conduce al secondo problema: nell'interpretazione della Fussi, il problema più delicato riguarda infatti proprio Socrate. Fussi insiste a più riprese sul fallimento di Socrate rispetto a Callicle. Socrate non è in grado di parlare a Callicle perché si ostina nei ragionamenti, senza prestare attenzione alle esigenze del suo interlocutore: e questo depone contro le capacità retoriche di Socrate che risulterebbe abile nelle sole argomentazioni razionali senza però dimostrarsi in possesso di una capacità di persuasione. Come già osservato,

⁷⁷ Cf. Fussi (2006), 70-72.

insomma, Socrate non comprende l'importanza della persuasione. Ma è davvero così? Secondo la Fussi, un assunto di fondo della retorica è che crei un piacere: non solo la retorica adulatoria, ma anche la retorica buona crea piacere negli ascoltatori: soltanto che la retorica buona, a differenza di quella adulatoria, crea il piacere in modo strumentale, in vista del bene che si propone di ottenere.⁷⁸ Secondo me non è vero che l'obiettivo principale della retorica è solo ed esclusivamente il piacere: quello che conta davvero è la capacità di smuovere le emozioni degli ascoltatori, e per questo fine la retorica può anche pungere. E in questo caso anche Socrate non mancherebbe di abilità retoriche.

Inoltre non bisogna trascurare l'eventualità che Callicle sia uno degli incurabili di cui Socrate parla nel mito finale (cfr. 525c1-8). Se così fosse, la questione della mancata persuasione di Callicle risulterebbe meno problematico. Perché quello che conta non è tanto persuadere Callicle, quanto gli altri: il pubblico che nel dialogo assiste al confronto tra Socrate e Callicle e tutti i lettori del dialogo, che in questo scontro tra Callicle e Socrate possono vedere due modelli di vita contrapposti e possono apprezzare la bontà dell'insegnamento di Socrate. Nella discussione con Callicle Socrate non ricorre solo ad argomentazioni razionali, ma usa anche immagini incisive, ripiega sul mito, insiste retoricamente su concetti come l'*eros* e il desiderio di verità per trovare un rapporto con Callicle. Il fallimento, insomma, non va imputato a Socrate, ma a Callicle, uno degli incurabili.

Un'ulteriore conferma è poi data dal comportamento dei due: un altro strumento di cui si avvale la retorica è il proprio comportamento pratico, le proprie scelte di vita. Mentre Callicle è una personalità thymoeidetica, Socrate è una persona capace di trovare un giusto equilibrio tra le componenti emotive e le istanze razionali del suo animo. In altre parole, la miscela di retorica e argomentazioni che troviamo nel personaggio Socrate serve a Platone per parlare ad altri, agli

⁷⁸ Cf. Fussi (2006), 70, cfr. anche 83 a proposito del mito.

ascoltatori e ai lettori che in Socrate vedrebbero un modello della vera filosofia, che non si ferma alla sola discussione ma è capace anche di scelte esistenziali coerenti.⁷⁹

A questo proposito merita di essere brevemente discusso anche il saggio di Antoni Bosch-Veciana.⁸⁰ Come Alessandra Fussi, anche Bosch-Veciana insiste sull'importanza della forma dialogica, negando di conseguenza che il *Gorgia* possa essere sfruttato come documento per ricostruire le tesi del Socrate storico. Ma a differenza della Fussi, egli ritiene che il personaggio Socrate svolga un ruolo di primo piano nell'economia del dialogo. Il tema di fondo del *Gorgia* ruota intorno alla domanda “chi sei tu?” (447d1), una domanda che non riguarda soltanto la professione di Gorgia e Socrate, ma anche le scelte di vita.⁸¹ Questa domanda inizialmente viene rivolta da Socrate a Gorgia, ma in seguito riguarderà lo stesso Socrate: in questo senso, come già aveva osservato Charles Kahn, il *Gorgia* serve a chiarire che cosa è la filosofia. Nel *Gorgia* Socrate emerge così come il vero eroe filosofico di Platone, capace sia di argomentazioni razionali sia di persuadere: la differenza tra lui e gli altri personaggi non si risolve insomma nella semplice opposizione tra il filosofo e il retore, ma tra chi sa persuadere perché è capace di insegnare e impartire una conoscenza (una conoscenza non necessariamente perfetta: Socrate) e chi invece cerca di persuadere senza preoccuparsi della conoscenza (Gorgia, Polo, Callicle, cfr. p. 132).

6. Socrates in the *Theaetetus*

Der *Theaitetos* ist ein später Dialog und wie eine mittlerweile reiche Forschung belegt, ein Dialog, der außergewöhnlich viele Aspekte beinhaltet, die für die Beurteilung des sogenannten Sokratischen Problems instruktiv sind. Es handelt

⁷⁹ A questo proposito cfr. anche le interessanti osservazioni di Caizzi Decleva (2003), 373.

⁸⁰ Cf. Bosch-Veciana (2007), 93-136.

⁸¹ Cf. Bosch-Veciana (2007), 101.

sich schon deshalb nicht um einen rein theoretischen Dialog⁸²: Bemerkenswert ist die dramatische Ausgestaltung der Gesprächsführung, insbesondere der Eingangspassage, die Platon nicht nur ausführlich und detailreich gestaltet, sondern dabei – wohl bewusst – einige Parallelen zu Frühdialogen einfließen lässt.⁸³ Besonders Sokrates’ eigener Vergleich mit einer Hebamme hat zu einer Flut von Deutungen geführt, da Sokrates hier sein eigenes Gesprächsverhalten ausführlicher als sonst erklärend thematisiert. Umstritten ist dabei natürlich, ob Platon rückblickend eine Erläuterungen für den Elenchos der Frühdialoge liefern wollte, oder ob der Sokrates des *Theaitetos* hier und später im Dialog konzeptionelle Änderungen bekannt gibt⁸⁴ und in welchem Verhältnis zum Rest des Dialoges dieser Vergleich steht.

Anhand des *Theaitetos* werden in neuerer Literatur mindestens 3 Fragen diskutiert, die zum sog. Sokratischen Problemkreis gehören: (i) Die Bedeutung der Mäeutik-Passage für das Sokratesbild und Selbsterkenntnis. (ii) Spezieller ist die Frage nach der Bedeutung des Philosophen-Bildes in der Episode für das Sokratesbild. (iii) Grundsätzlich und umfassender wird diskutiert, wie stark und in welchem Sinne sokratisch der *Theaitetos* insgesamt ist.

Insbesondere (iii) ist spätestens seit David Sedley’s Buch *The Midwife of Platonism*, dessen These bereits in früheren Versionen diskutiert wurde,⁸⁵ eine wichtige Frage. Hinzukommt eine neuere Arbeit (2008) von A. Tschemplik (*Knowledge and Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Theaetetus*), die der Bedeutung der nach dem sokratischen Wissen vom Nicht-Wissen als Schlüssel für den Dialog und insbesondere das Scheitern der Definitionssuche nach geht.

Diese Debatte (iii) erfordert eine gesonderte und ausführliche Erörterung. Erstens kann sie noch als nicht abgeschlossen gelten und ferner betrifft sie eine

⁸² Cf. Natorp (1961), S. 92.

⁸³ Vergleiche etwa *Tht.* 143d und 146a mit *Chrm.* 153d ff. Gerade im Rahmen des ersten Teiles lässt Platon Theaitetos Definitionsfehler begehen (146d-e), die für Gesprächsteilnehmer in den Frühdialogen typisch waren (siehe z.B. *Men.* 71 e ff.).

⁸⁴ Cf. exemplarisch Burnyeat (1977).

⁸⁵ Cf. Sedley (2003) und Woolf (2003).

noch umfassendere Diskussion bzw. bereitet diese vor, nämlich die nach dem sokratischen Charakter weiterer Spätdialoge (und damit in letzter Konsequenz dem Gesamtwerk Platons).⁸⁶ Sedley's Interpretation, der zufolge Sokrates im *Theaitetos* noch nicht Platoniker ist, aber dem Platonismus zur Geburt verhilft, bereitet diese letztgenannte Diskussion vor. Aus diesem Grunde hat sich das Review-Team vorgenommen, darauf im nächsten Bericht, also auf die Fragen (i) und besonders (iii) gesondert und ausführlicher einzugehen, um dieser neuen Literatur dann besser Rechnung tragen zu können. Isolierbar und daher hier abzuhandeln ist (ii), zumal die Frage nach dem Philosophenbild der so genannten „Episode“ oder „Digression“, seltener im Rahmen des Sokratischen Problems erörtert worden ist. Lange Zeit hat man sich bei der Kommentierung auf die von Platon sicher ernst gemeinte Kritik an der Lebensform der Redner konzentriert. Das Bild vom Philosophen wurde jedoch lange als positive Bestimmung Platons akzeptiert. In jüngster Zeit mehren sich aber Forschungsbeiträge, die gerade die Ausführungen zum Philosophen in der so genannten Digression kritisch diskutieren, gerade weil das dort entworfene Bild von einem Philosophen für einige Kommentatoren nicht leicht in Einklang mit dem Sokrates-Bild, das Platon sonst gibt, zu bringen ist. Diese Debatte hatte nur wenig Vorläufer. Ähnlich wie Wilamowitz-Moellendorff die Episode als Resignation Platons deutet, in dem ein Idealbild eines weltabgewandten Philosophen gezeichnet werde,⁸⁷ versteht W. Jaeger sie als Hinweis Platons, dass er sich von nun an ganz der theoretischen Philosophie zu widmen.⁸⁸ Obschon Jaegers These nicht stimmen konnte, weil der *Politikos* unzweifelhaft nach dem *Theaitetos* geschrieben wurde und praktische Fragen behandelt, hat Jaeger darauf hingewiesen, dass der in der Digression von Sokrates selbst beschriebene Philosoph keine Ähnlichkeit mit ihm selbst hat. Die Unterschiede zwischen Sokrates und dem Philosoph der Episode wurden jüngst in einigen Arbeiten zum *Theaitetos*, wie in Jörg Hardy Buch *Platons Theorie des*

⁸⁶ Siehe Sc. 2 dieses reviews.

⁸⁷ Cf. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1919), 414.

⁸⁸ Cf. Jaeger (1960), 347-393.

Wissens im „Theaitet“,⁸⁹ (wieder) fest gestellt und besonders von Rachel Rue ausführlich dokumentiert.⁹⁰ Von den vielen Besonderheiten ist für besonders auffällig, dass von dem Philosoph der Episode gesagt wird: *kai tauta pant’ oud’ hoti ouk oiden, oiden*.⁹¹ Rachel Rue bilanziert: “A less Socratic philosopher would be hard to find”.⁹² Rue sammelt viele Belege für die Differenz zwischen der Schilderung des Philosophen der Episode und Sokrates, sie möchte aber keinerlei Erklärung anbieten. Marcel van Ackeren hat im Kontext einer größeren Untersuchung (*Das Wissen vom Guten*) über die Entwicklung des Zusammenhangs von Wissen und Tugend in den drei Dialogphasen die These vertreten,⁹³ Platon beschreibe und kritisiere, in der Episode in karikaturhafter Form ein theoretisches Philosophiekonzept, dass sich ganz auf das Wissen von Universalien konzentriere und dabei jede Beziehung zu Einzeldingen und Praxis aufgeben habe und schon deshalb nicht sokratisch sei. In andern Dialogen schließe das Wissen eines Philosophen Wissen von den Ideen Wissen von raumzeitlichen Partizipanten ein.⁹⁴ Neben den Erkenntnisgegenständen entsprächen auch Platons sonstige Angaben über den Erkenntnisweg nicht der Digression, da für Platon Ideenwissen durch die Auseinandersetzung mit empirisch Erfahrbaren zustande komme.⁹⁵ Und ohne Erfahrung und ohne Bezug zu konkreten Einzeldingen könne auch ein Philosoph nicht handeln und das Handeln sei Konstituens der Verähnlichung mit Gott (*homiôsis theô*) und dem Glück.⁹⁶

⁸⁹ Cf. Hardy (2001).

⁹⁰ Cf. Rue (1993).

⁹¹ Cf. *Tht.* 173e. Cf. *Ap.* 20d ff. Gerade das Ende des *Theaitetos* spielt auf das Bewußtsein vom Nicht-Wissen an (vgl. *Tht* 150c-d, 179b und 210b). Die Bedeutung der sokratischen Formulierungen ist umstritten. Siehe dazu die Debatte bei Notomi (2004), 179-185.

⁹² Cf. Rue (1993), 78.

⁹³ Cf. van Ackeren (2003), Kap. 3. 2.

⁹⁴ Cf. *Phdr.* 249b-c. *Phlb.* 62c; *Rep.* 520b, *Phdr.* 250c ff.

⁹⁵ Zur Erfahrung des Philosophen siehe *Rep.* 482e-583a.

⁹⁶ Cf. *Tht.* 176b-c. Siehe zum Glück durch Handeln, das durch Ideenwissen geleitet wird *Rep.* 500, Zur Gottähnlichkeit durch gutes Handeln siehe *Rep.* 360b.

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