The first Treatise on the Soul in China and its sources: an examination of the Spanish edition of the Lingyan lishao by Duceux

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THE FIRST TREATISE ON THE SOUL IN CHINA AND ITS SOURCES

An examination of the Spanish edition of the *Lingyan lishao* by Duceux

THIERRY MEYNARD S.J.*

Abstract: In 1624, the Italian Jesuit Francesco Sambiasi and the Chinese scholar-officer Xu Guangqi produced the *Lingyan lishao* [*Humble Attempt at Discussing Matters Pertaining to the Soul*]. My study serves as a supplement to the recent edition of the text by Isabelle Duceux, by showing how the *Lingyan lishao* takes its roots in the Coimbra *De Anima* commentary (1598). I show also that, in the process of transmitting the Western discourse of the soul to Chinese culture, the traditional boundaries between theology and philosophy were reshaped.

Key-words: Aristotelianism, *De Anima*, Jesuit Philosophy, China, F. Sambiasi.

Resumo: Em 1624 o Jesuíta italiano Francesco Sambiasi e o erudito e funcionário chinês Xu Guangqi publicaram *Lingyan lishao* [*Humilde Ensaio de Discussão de Assuntos Relacionados com a Alma*]. O presente estudo pretende ser um suplemento à recente edição do mesmo texto por Isabelle Duceux, demonstrando que o *Lingyan lishao* se funda no Comentário ao *De Anima* de Coimbra (1598). Fica também demonstrado que, neste processo de transmissão do discurso ocidental sobre a alma para a cultura chinesa, se deu uma nova configuração às fronteiras entre teologia e filosofia.

Palavras-chave: Aristotelismo, *De Anima*, Filosofia na Companhia de Jesus, China, F. Sambiasi.

* Professor at Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou. I would like to thank Professor Mário Carvalho, Coimbra University, for giving me important bibliographical references. Professor Vicent Shen Qingsong, Toronto University, provided also some useful comments on Aristotelian philosophy. Isabelle Duceux reacted also to my evaluation of her work, clarifying that she did not have access to the Coimbra commentaries while writing her study. Huang Zhipeng, PhD student at Sun Yat-sen University, did the proofreading of the Chinese quotes. Finally, Francis Nguyen S.J. polished the English.

Introduction

Chinese Christian texts of the Late Ming and Early Qing present a major difficulty concerning the sources being used. In 1935, the French Vincentian priest Hubert Verhaeren compared some Late Ming-Early Qing writings with the Coimbra Aristotelian commentaries written by the Jesuits, and he discovered that four works were “renditions,” as distinguished from translations, of the Coimbra commentaries. Among those four works, the first one is the *Lingyan lishao* 靈言蠡勺, taught orally (*koushou* 口授) by Bi Fangji 畢方濟 (Francesco Sambiassi, 1582-1649) and transcribed (*bilu* 筆錄) by Xu Guangqi 徐光啟 (1562-1633). The preface is dated the seventh month of the first year of the reign of emperor Tianqi 天啓, which corresponds to the period between August 14th and September 12nd, 1624. According to Verhaeren, the work takes its source in the Coimbra commentary on *De Anima*, written in the second half of the 1580s by the Portuguese Jesuit Manuel de Gois (1547-1597), but published posthumously in 1598, some twenty-five years before our Chinese text.¹ This work constitutes the first appearance of a treatise in China dedicated entirely to the question of the soul, a question as central to Western thought as the question of God.²

In comparing the Chinese text with the Latin text, Verhaeren encountered two main difficulties. First, the second *juan*, or fascicle, of the *Lingyan lishao* does not deal with philosophy, but rather contains two “homilies,” one on the similarities of the human soul to God, and the other on the Supreme Good of the soul, that is, God. Also, concerning the first *juan*, Verhaeren recognized the difficulty of putting in parallel the lengthy Coimbra commentary with the much shorter *Lingyan lishao*. However, he explained this difficulty by mentioning at the end of the Chinese text: “grasping one and leaving out ten thousand” (*guiyi louwan* 挂一漏萬), and thus he considered the *Lingyan lishao* as a synopsis. He established the dependence of the work on the Latin commentary based on three grounds, which are not fully developed. First, the introduction of the Chinese text is a close translation of the first paragraph of the introduction (*proemium*) of the Coimbra commentary; second, the

¹ Bulletin Catholique de Pékin N. 264 (Août 1935) : 417-429. For a presentation of the commentary, see Mário Carvalho, “Pierre Bayle et la critique d’Averroès à Coimbra; deux épisodes de l’histoire de la réception d’Averroès,” *Revista Filosófica de Coimbra* 44 (2013): 420-421.

² Giulio Alieni had worked on the same years on a treatise on the soul, perhaps without mutual knowledge, since Alieni was based in Fujian province and Sambiassi in Shanghai. The *Xingxue Cushu* (*General Introduction to the Learning on Human Nature*) was translated and composed (*yizhu*) by Alieni around 1624, but was published only in 1646, some three years before his death.

structures of the two works are similar; third, the section on the intellect (*lunmingwuzhe* 論明悟者) describing the production of four images in the cognitive process translates closely the text of Coimbra.³ Unfortunately, Verhaeren's pioneer research did not go further.

More recently, Isabelle Duceux produced an outstanding Chinese-Spanish bilingual edition of the *Lingyan lishao*. In it, she challenged Verhaeren's view, stating "it is very unlikely that the *Lingyan lishao* is simply an adaptation of the Coimbra commentary on the soul."⁴ Besides the two difficulties mentioned by Verhaeren himself, Duceux raised another difficulty. There are many comments in the *Lingyan lishao* that touch on theological questions, with parallels in the *Summa theologica*, and do not come from a philosophical commentary on the *De Anima*, either the one by Aquinas or by the Coimbra Jesuits.

Neither Verhaeren nor Duceux have made a thorough comparison between the *Lingyan lishao* and the Coimbra commentary. Indeed, it is an arduous task to search into this lengthy Latin commentary for parallels with the Chinese text. Without pretending to be exhaustive, I spent some time investigating the matter in a more systematic way. The question is complex since many passages of the Coimbra commentary refers to the *Summa theologica*. Therefore, it is necessary to look for a specific interpretation of the Coimbra commentary, also present in the *Lingyan lishao*. This is not a pure philological question, but points to other important questions. How the Jesuits envisioned the relationship between philosophy and theology? How the Coimbra commentary may be innovative in rearticulating the traditional boundaries of philosophy and theology? How the Jesuits communicated their vision to China?

Structure of the *Lingyan lishao* and its preface

The structure of the *Lingyan lishao* is quite straightforward. In the first *juan*, after a general introduction (*yin* 引), the text deals with the question

³ LYLS (*Lingyan lishao*), *Xu Guangqi quanji* 徐光啟全集, edited by Zhu Weizheng 朱維錚 and Li Tiangang 李天綱, (Shanghai : Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2010), vol. 3, 399 : 緣是格物之家分物象為四等... It exists another punctuated edition: *Mingqingzhiji xixuewenben* 明清之際西學文本, edited by Huang Xingtao 黃興濤 (Beijing : Zhonghua shuju, 2013), 317-353. In both modern editions, the Chinese text is based on the *Tianxue chuhan* (1629) realized by Li Zhizao. Parallel in the *Commentary of De Anima* (Coimbra, 1598), Liber 3, c. 5, q. 3, a. 2, 335: "Porro quibusdam veluti gradibus ascendunt species, quae cognitionis principia existent..."

⁴ Isabelle Duceux, *La introducción del aristotelismo en China à través del De Anima, Siglos XVI-XVII* (México : El Colegio de México, 2009), 36.

of the soul as substance (*ti* 體), then with the vegetative and sensitive souls (*shengneng jueneng* 生能覺能). After a general discussion on the intellectual soul, its three powers are presented: memory (*jihan* 記含), intellect (*mingwu* 明悟) and will (*aiyu* 愛欲). The second *juan* discusses on the dignity of the soul as being in the likeness of God, and then discusses on the attributes of God.

Verhaeren had already noted the sharp contrast between the two *juan*, praising the first *juan* as a work of philosophy, but discarding the second *juan* as mere “homilies” filled with oratory repetitions. Unlike Verhaeren, Duceux considered the second *juan* as an elaborated work of theology, and interestingly she divided the work in three parts. The first part deals with the definition of the soul; the second part, about the cognitive dimensions of the soul, deals with the vegetative and sensitive souls, and with memory and intellect; the third part, theological, discusses the will at the end of the first *juan* and the union of the soul with God in the second *juan*.

I shall re-examine the structure of the work, but let us turn first to the preface. As expected, it gives the reasons for the importance of the study of the soul. First, the study of the soul allows the “knowledge of the self” (*renji* 認己), as it is “inscribed on the fronton of a great school in ancient times.” This echoes the sentence written on the Temple of Delphi, as mentioned by the Coimbra commentary, which explains further: “No one can know himself without considering the nature and dignity of his soul.”⁵ This Socratic reference in an Aristotelian commentary is quite surprising. However, as Mário Carvalho explains, this theme is characteristic of the Renaissance, which places human being as the center of the universe, in whose spirit the unity between knowledge and truth is realized.⁶

The second reason for the importance of studying the soul is that, by knowing the faculties of the soul and its beauty, human beings understand the moral principles (*li* 理) in order to conduct their lives and manage others, especially on how to moderate and control feelings “according to the moral principles” (*congli* 從理). The Coimbra commentary indeed mentions the ethical application of the study of the soul: “Reason holds the highest control of the soul so that it subjects to itself the concupiscible and irascible powers.”⁷ The Chinese text refers also to the Aristotelian notion of the science of the

⁵ Coimbra, Proemium, 1: “Sententia foribus templi Delphici: ... nosse autem se nemo potest, nisi animi sui naturam et dignitatem perspectam habeat.”

⁶ In the Jesuit commentary Carvahlo sees the beginnings of a new science, later called psychology, establishing a true science of the soul and a foundation for philosophy and morality. See Mário Santiago Carvalho, “Imaginação, pensamento e conhecimento de si,” *Revista Filosófica de Coimbra* 37 (2010): 26-27.

⁷ Coimbra, Proemium, 1: “Ratio summam animae arcem teneat, ut inde appetendi & irascendi vim sibi subiciat.”

soul as a therapy, which is also present in the Coimbra commentary: “the knowledge of the soul is necessary for the physicians to cure the physical illness; it is even more necessary to cure spiritual ailments.”⁸ In contrast to the Coimbra commentary, the *Lingyan lishao* insists on the knowledge of the soul in order to manage others. It follows the traditional Chinese categories of managing the household (*qijia*齊家), ruling the country (*zhiguo*治國) and pacifying the world (*pingtianxia*平天下). Sambiasi and Xu Guangqi probably had in mind the literati and how this science of the soul could be applied to their duties as officers in the imperial administration.

Third advantage of the studying the soul is that one knows a little bit “the nature of God” (*Tianzhu zhi xing*天主之性): “Due to the fact that the nature of the soul has plenty of goodness, the soul can return to the source of all the goods.”⁹ The notion of good (*bonum* in Latin) is expressed into Chinese through a neologism (*meihao*美好), probably to avoid using the word *shan*善, which is a key concept in Chinese philosophy and an object of many different debates and opinions.¹⁰ Based on this notion of good, the notion of God as the supreme good (*summum bonum* 至美好) is construed.

Knowing oneself, helping others and knowing God are thus the three great advantages of the study of the soul. From the start, the reflection includes philosophical, moral and spiritual aspects. This last dimension is further underlined with the mention that the soul holds a unique place as the “horizon” (*diping*地坪) which connects eternity and temporality. The Coimbra commentary refers this idea to Hermes Trismegistus, an ancient Christian writer who became popular again during the Renaissance because of his vision of humanity at the center of the universe.¹¹ Drawing from

⁸ LYLS, 381: 醫者欲療肉體之病，尚須習亞尼瑪之學。知人者療靈心之病，其須習也，殆有甚焉。Coimbra, Proemium, 1-2: “Huc pertinet illa Aristotelis communitio in extremo capite libri I Ethicorum, sicuti medici, qui remedia curandis corporibus adhibent, ut munere suo probe fungantur, in animorum cognitione multum operae collocant; ita ac multò potiori ratione Philosopho civili, qui sanandis animi morbis studet, comperta esse debere, quae ad animi scientiam spectant.”

⁹ LYLS, 382: 為依其本性所有諸美好，可溯及於諸美好之源也。Coimbra, Proemium, 2: “Humana mens se supra se convertens, à se ipsa ad divinam naturam, à qua profecta est, revocatur, et quicquid ipsa perfectionis habet, in Deo omnium perfectionum fonte invenit.”

¹⁰ *Meihao* exists in Chinese language as an adjective. Later on, in order to emphasize further the foreignness of the concept of good, Alfonso Vagnone in his *Xiushen xixue* inverted the two Chinese characters and created with *haomei* a neologism. See my article: “Aristotelian ethics in the land of Confucius: a study of Vagnone’s Western Learning on Personal Cultivation,” in *Antiquorum Philosophia* 7 (2013): 145-169.

¹¹ Coimbra, Proemium, 2: “Animus rationis consiliique particeps (ut Trismegistus in Asclepio ait) sit veluti Orizon aeternitatis et temporis.”

Western astronomy, the *Lingyan lishao* explains in a note that human being is situated in this horizon which delimits spatially the six superior zodiacs (*gong* 宮) and the six inferior zodiacs. Though the Coimbra commentary makes no reference to this, the *Lingyan lishao* clearly inherits from the Coimbra commentary this emphasis on the human mind as the foundation of the science of the soul. While Aristotle integrated the science of the soul within the framework of natural philosophy (physics, biology, medicine, etc), the science of the soul has become here the overall framework integrating the physical, biological, cosmological, ethical and spiritual dimensions of human beings.

This broad vision of humanity as center of the universe would surely have a strong resonance among Chinese literati who see human being as connected to heaven (*tian* 天) and earth (*di* 地). The *Lingyan lishao* does not limit the soul within the boundaries of the physical universe, however immense it may be, because it connects the soul to the eternity, that is, realities beyond this world. Following the Coimbra commentary, the *Lingyan lishao* attempts to build a transcendental science of the soul.

In order to reinforce the importance of the study of the soul, the Chinese text mentions for the first time the name of Saint Augustine, whose philosophy consisted of only two questions: the soul and *Dousi* 陡斯, i.e. Deus.¹² Still according to Augustine's words, there is a distinction between the possibility of receiving happiness (*keshoufu* 可受福) and the actual enjoyment of happiness (*xiangfu* 享福).¹³

The preface indicates also the four parts of the work: soul as substance, the faculties or powers of the soul, the dignity of the soul, and the inclinations of the soul towards the attributes of the good. This division is somehow different from the one proposed by Verhaeren or Duceux, and I shall propose my own interpretation at the end.

¹² One may see here a reference to the famous words of Augustine in the *Soliloquia* (chapter 1: Deum et animam scire cupio, nihil aliud). However, the Coimbra commentary refers to a passage of the *De Ordine*.

¹³ See LYLS, 382. See Coimbra, Proemium, 2: "D. Augustinus 2 De Ordine, cap. 8, asserit; nimirum duas esse praecipuas in Philosophia quaestiones; unam de anima; alteram de Deo. Primam, efficere ut nos ipsos noverimus; alteram, ut originem nostram; illam nobis dulciorem, hanc chariorem esse; illam nos dignos beata vita; hanc beatos reddere." The Coimbra Jesuits explain further their understanding of the two kinds of happiness in their commentary on *Nicomachean Ethics* (1593), which was rendered into Chinese by Vagnone in the *Xiushen xixue*.

The substance of the intellective soul and its characteristics

The first section concerning the soul as substance does not give a definition of the soul, but lists nine characteristics of the intellective soul. The first eight follow closely the Coimbra commentary, almost in the same order.¹⁴ Let us briefly examine each of them. The first characteristic of the intellective soul is to be a substance. The concepts of substance (*zilizhiti* 自立之體) and accident (*yilaizhe* 依賴者) were introduced by Ricci in *The Real Meaning of the Lord of Heaven* (*Tianzhu shiyi*, 1603). The *Lingyan lishao* adopts the same translations, explaining that the soul is a substance because it has a principle of life in itself. In other words, the living beings constitute the common genus (*zong* 總), and the human soul is a species (*zhuan* 專) within the genus because it alone “discusses principles” (*lunli* 論理).¹⁵ Interestingly, the soul is not defined here in relation to the animal and sensitive body, but in relation to the broadest genus, life. This is exactly the approach taken by the Coimbra commentary, which discusses the question whether the soul is a substance, stating that a living being has a substance, that is, an inner principle of organization ensuring its own preservation.¹⁶ Unlike Aquinas and the middle-age scholastics, the Coimbra commentary stresses here the biological foundation for the science of the soul, and the *Lingyan lishao* adopted the same starting point.

Second, the soul is subsistent (*benzizai* 本自在). The *Lingyan lishao* enumerates three types of soul: vegetative (*shenghun* 生魂), sensitive (*juehun* 覺魂) and intellective (*linghun* 靈魂). The first two souls are not subsistent because they originate from matter (*zhi* 質) and rely on a body to exist. When the body upon which the vegetative and sensitive souls relied on is exhausted, those two souls are also exhausted. Only the intellective

¹⁴ Liber 2, from question 1 (32) to question 6 (78).

¹⁵ LYLS, 384. In the *Summa theologica*, Aquinas considers the human soul as part of the common genus of the animals, but being a different species because of its difference of form, i.e., the rational capacity. ST, Ia, q. 75, a. 3: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo, etsi conveniat in genere cum aliis animalibus, specie tamen differt, differentia autem specie attenditur secundum differentiam formae. Nec oportet quod omnis differentia formae faciat generis diversitatem.” Isabelle Duceux translates *zilizhiti* 自立之體 in Spanish as “substancia subsistente” (50). This does not seem necessary to me to add this qualification of subsistent, which I reserve for the next dimension of the soul, as *benzizai* 本自在, a term that Duceux translates quite strangely as “algo originalmente independiente” (51).

¹⁶ Coimbra, Liber II, c. 1, q. 1, a. 4, 39: “Ita qui in qualibet re viventi animadverterit contrarias qualitates ad concentum reductas conservari, & repugnantes organorum affectiones, ne se mutuò perimant, rata lege cohiberi, & denique tam diversa munia tanto ordine, & consensus administrari; planè intelliget dari unam aliquam formam, cuius merito ac beneficio haec omnia perficiantur.”

soul is subsistent in itself because it does not originate from matter, and therefore can continue its existence even when the body dies.¹⁷ In a note, the text explains further the difference between a substance and a subsistent substance: a horse has a substance, but only the intellective soul, or the intellect, has a subsistent substance, since it is not relying on a body. In the *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas introduced the notion of subsistent substance as not originating from matter and thus independent from the body. This is repeated by the Coimbra commentary, which refers to this same passage from Aquinas.¹⁸

The third characteristic of the intellective soul is that it belongs to the category of spiritual (*shenzhilei* 神之類), and this affirmation corrects the wrong theories that claim the intellective soul is *qi* 氣, or matter. Similarly, the Coimbra commentary lists some materialist thinkers, like Zeno who believed the human soul to be fire, or Anaximander, to be air.¹⁹ For Empedocles, air refers to one of the four material elements, along with fire, water and earth. However, it should be noted that Chinese philosophy does not reduce *qi* to a material element, and for Zhu Xi, *qi* consists in the psycho-physiological make up of human beings. Not having fully understood the complex meaning of *qi*, Ricci and the other missionaries were critical of this notion, which they read as materialistic. Thus, the *Lingyan lishao* targets here not only the materialistic Greek thinkers but also the Neo-Confucian philosophers.

The fourth characteristic is to be immortal (*bunengsi* 不能死), unlike the vegetative and sensitive souls of other beings, which perish with their body. The theory that all the three souls in human beings perish at death is refuted,²⁰ as well as the theory that states the intellective soul exists alone after the death of the body. This last theory is not acceptable since it compromises the unity of the soul. Even though the body perishes, the vegetative and sensitive souls continue to exist, but without exerting their functions. At the resurrection (*fusheng* 复生), the vegetative and the sensitive souls are reunited

¹⁷ About the passage concerning the vegetative and sensitive souls, Duceux translates: “Ambas dependen de la sustancia para su existencia. El lugar al cual se conforman tiene un fin: por lo tanto, las almas vegetativa y sensitiva tienen un fin” (397). As it is clear from her introduction, especially the footnote (52), Duceux has wrongly understood *jin* 盡 as indicating a teleological end.

¹⁸ ST Ia, q. 75, a. 2. Coimbra, Liber II, c.1, q. 2, a. 2, 49: “Inter animas sola intellectiva est subsistens secundo modo. Probatur, quia omnes animae, excepta intellectiva, educuntur de materiae potestate...”

¹⁹ See Coimbra, Liber II, c. 1. q. 1, a. 6, 41.

²⁰ Duceux explains that Sambiasi refutes here the theory of Averroes of the separated intellect (56-57). In fact, it seems to us that he refutes here the materialistic position.

with the intellectualive soul.²¹ The Coimbra commentary does not discuss the immortality of the soul because Aristotle only affirmed the immortality of the agent intellect. Therefore, it was difficult to build the case of the soul's immortality in a commentary on the *De Anima*. However, the Coimbra Jesuits still believed it was possible to demonstrate the immortality of the entire soul through natural reason. In their appendix to their commentary on the *De Anima*, they added a "Treatise on the separated soul" in which they precisely demonstrated the immortality of the soul.²² In the *Real Meaning of the Lord of Heaven*, Ricci mentioned the enjoyment of eternal happiness in the paradise, but he did not mention the resurrection of the whole person, including the body. Here probably for the first time in China, a rational explanation of this central belief of Christianity is presented.

Next, we have three similar aspects of the soul, (5) as being created by God, (6) out of nothing, (7) in time and place. The text states that the human soul is created by God, and not by spirits (*shen* 神) or others. It provides a rational explanation that God is the creator of everything, including humanity and angels (*tianshen* 天神), all things visible and invisible, and therefore the human soul is necessarily created by God. The theological idea of creation goes clearly beyond the Aristotelian theory of the soul. However, similar to our Chinese text, the Coimbra commentary discusses the question, and specifically denies the theory that angels or spiritual powers created the human soul.²³ The soul is created *ex nihilo* (*cong wu wu er you* 從無物而有), not drawn from a part of God or the great soul of the world. This affirmation seems at odd with the emphasis of the Coimbra commentary in affirming that, due to its unity, the soul cannot be created without matter. In this sense the soul is created after the creation of the world and could not be created without matter. However, it is also affirmed that human being draws his form not out of matter, but from the intellectualive soul which has a divine origin. In fact, both the Latin and Chinese texts reject the Gnostic idea of emanation and the Platonic and Averroist idea of the pre-existence of a great soul of the world. The precedence of the intellectualive soul over the body should not be

²¹ The *Lingyan lishao* seems to refer here to the theory of Averroes, according to whom it exist one active intellectualive soul, common to all human beings and independent from the individual souls. The Coimbra commentary presents and refutes this theory, reminding that the Fifth Council of the Lateran (1513) had condemned it. Coimbra, Liber II, c. 1, q. 7, a. 2, 80-82.

²² *Tractatus de anima separata* (Coimbra, 1598), 441-532.

²³ Avicenna had proposed such a theory. See Liber II, c. 1, q. 3, a. 1, 55: "Pro eorum autem dogmate, qui animas hominum ab Angelis produci contendebant, haec sunt argumenta."

understood chronologically, but essentially.²⁴ It is therefore denied the idea that God created the rational part of each individual soul at the beginning of the world and later on infuses the body, an idea voiced by Augustine in his *De immortalitate animae* but not retained by the dogma. Similarly, the Coimbra commentary considers that the soul is created at the time of conception.²⁵

After the theological aspects of the created soul, the text returns to a philosophical characteristic: the soul as a substantial form. The intellectual soul is not an accidental form, external and visible, but a substantial form, which is internal and absolutely necessary. This denies that the intellectual soul is made out of the four qualities of hot, cold, dry and moist, which could assemble and dissipate. This theory reminds us of Empedocles, mentioned above, who said that the soul is made of four natural elements. Yet, the *Lingyan lishao* probably targets the Chinese conception of all sentient beings as being made of a temporary assembling of five natural elements produced by the *qi*.²⁶

The last characteristic of the soul gets the longest exposition, underlining its importance. The soul has not its finality in itself but in God, and thus needs to rely on grace (*e' lai ji ya* 額辣濟亞), or God's special providence (*teyou* 特祐). This unfolds in three steps: first, the intellectual soul receives the grace from God, then maintains it through good actions until death, and finally receives true happiness as a reward. Duceux noticed here a great shift, both in approach and sources. The approach is not philosophical *per se*, but theological. Indeed, checking the Coimbra commentary, I did not find any special discussion on the question of grace, divine providence, will or happiness. Also, the sources are not Thomistic anymore, but Augustinian. Duceux shows that the Jesuit interest on the question of the soul was in fact subordinated to the question of grace, that is, the relation between divine providence and human freedom, a question central in the debates of Renaissance, especially against Protestantism.²⁷ The question of the grace shall reappear below, in the section on the will.

Then the text returns to philosophy, refuting seven erroneous teachings on the soul. Duceux shows that those teachings find their root not only in ancient philosophy, but also in modern biology, for example the idea of

²⁴ LYLS, 385: 有原先後，無有時先後。

²⁵ Coimbra, Liber II, c. 1, q. 4, a. 2, 64: "Respondemus... animam intellectivam infundi & uniri corpori in eo instanti quo primum materia, & membrorum effigie, & caeteris accidentibus, quae talis forma exigit, instructa dispositaque est."

²⁶ Similarly, the Coimbra Commentary holds that the intellectual soul needs a substantial form. Coimbra, Liber II, c. 1, q. 6, a. 1, 72: "Ut sit principium essendi substantialiter ei, cuius est forma."

²⁷ See Duceux, 65.

locating the soul in the blood as expressed around the same time by William Harvey (1578-1657).²⁸ Like the Coimbra commentary, the *Lingyan lishao* denies this theory. This shows that the Jesuits were involved in debates with the most recent physiologist theories.²⁹

At first glance, out of the nine characteristics of the intellective soul, four can be qualified as philosophical and five theological. However, as I have shown above, the Coimbra Jesuits definitely tended to go beyond the traditional boundaries of philosophy and attempted to give a philosophical foundation to affirmations that were traditionally theological, like the creation of the soul and its immortality.

Vegetative and sensitive powers

In the introduction of the *Prima pars Quaestio* 78 in the *Summa theologica*, Aquinas discussed the order of the three powers of the soul, and he recognized that the intellective soul is the subject matter of theology. Yet, instead of adopting the teleological order of perfection, he first discussed the vegetative and sensitive powers, because he saw those two powers as a preamble to the intellective power. Similarly, the Coimbra commentary discusses the sensitive and vegetative powers as the biological and physiological basis for the intellective power, stating that “there are three souls distinguished in their mode of animating the material body; the vegetative and sensitive souls are two genus, contained in the tripartite composite; there is also one species, that is, the soul which participates to reason.”³⁰ Like Aquinas, the Coimbra Jesuits distinguished the vegetative and sensitive souls from the intellective soul. They aimed at subsuming the discourse on the vegetative and sensitive souls and the theory of perception, under a general theory of the intellective soul. However, because they paid due attention to the biological and physiological foundations of the soul, they chose an explanation through the generative order, and not from the order of perfection.

Like Aquinas and the Coimbra Jesuits, the *Lingyan lishao* follows the generative order and groups together the vegetative and sensitive power in

²⁸ See Duceux, 81-83.

²⁹ See Christoph Sander, “Medical Topics in the *De Anima* Commentary of Coimbra (1598) and the Jesuits’ Attitude towards Medicine in Education and Natural Philosophy,” in *Early Science and Medicine* 19 (2014): 76-101.

³⁰ Coimbra, Liber II, c. 3, q. 1, a. 1, 108: “Tres animas distinctas ex diverso modo sese excitandi supra materiam corporatam; ita ut in hac tripartita varietate contineantur duo genera, nempe anima vegetatrix & sentiens, & una species, id est, anima rationis participes.”

a same paragraph, then deals with the intellective power in a subsequent paragraph. It sees the vegetative and sensitive powers as the “direct cause of all actions and movements.”³¹ Similarly, listing the three functions of the vegetative power, it adopts also a generative order: nutrition, growth and reproduction.³²

The *Lingyan lishao* does not have much to say about the vegetative power. In dealing with the sensitive power, its presentation of the external senses is quite rudimentary, presenting only the list of the five senses without explaining the process of alteration occurring in perception. This rudimentary treatment of the external senses strongly contrasts with Aristotle’s *De Anima* and with its Coimbra commentary, which gives a detailed account.³³ The *Lingyan lishao* devotes most of the discussion to the inner senses. According to Aquinas, there are four: common sense, *phantasia*, estimative power and memory.³⁴ This order indicates a progression from the material to the immaterial. Also, Aquinas considered that, in the human being, the estimative power (called in that case cogitative power) and the memory “are not distinct powers, but the same, yet more perfect than in other animals.”³⁵ Therefore, for Aquinas, there are four inner senses in all animal beings, but in human beings, this could be reduced to three: common sense, *phantasia* and estimative power.

At this point, the Coimbra commentary strives to correct Aquinas’s opinion, by claiming the authority of Aristotle against Aquinas. According to the Coimbra Jesuits, a careful reading of the *De Anima* shows that there are only two inner senses, the common sense and *phantasia*, because the cogitative power is subsumed under *phantasia*.³⁶ Besides the authority of Aristotle, the Coimbra Jesuits offer their own rationale for reducing inner senses to only two. First, there are only two modes of alteration: the common sense is directly altered by sensible objects, and *phantasia* is altered through the mediation of images or sensible species. Second, the common sense functions in presence of an object, but *phantasia* continues in the absence of

³¹ LYLS, 389: 萬行萬動、至近至切之所以然。

³² According to the order of perfection, reproduction comes first because one being reproduces the same similar being. See ST, Ia, q. 78, a.2, resp.

³³ See Coimbra, Liber II, c. 7-12, 162-268; and Liber III, c. 1-2, 272-293.

³⁴ ST Ia, q. 78, a.4, resp. Also Coimbra, Liber III, c. 3, q. 1, a. 1, 302.

³⁵ ST Ia, q. 78, a.4, ad 5.

³⁶ Coimbra, Liber III, c. 3, q. 1, a. 3, 305-306: “Denique quod haec nostra opinio Peripatetico dogmati non repugnet, ex eo ostenditur, quia Aristoteles capite secundo, & tertio huius libri, potentias sensitivas internas accuratè investigavit, non plures invenit, constituitve quàm duas; videlicet sensum communem & phantasiam.” Coimbra, Liber III, c. 3, q. 2, a. 2, 311: “Docet ergo D. Thomas locis citatis, vim cogitatricem (quam nos à phantasia non distinguimus)...”

objects. Also, common sense apprehends only sensibles, but *phantasia* can apprehend also non-sensible object.³⁷ This shows the freedom of the Jesuits in their interpretation, and Carvalho qualifies the Jesuit position as “modern.”³⁸ On this important question of the number of the inner senses, the *Lingyan lishao* does not follow Aquinas’s classification of three or four senses, but the Coimbra commentary’s classification of the two senses. Duceux clearly saw the discrepancy, but she did not see that the *Lingyan lishao* was following on this point, as well as many others, the Coimbra commentary.

Concerning the first inner sense, i.e. the common sense (*gongsi* 公司), the *Lingyan lishao*’s presentation is quite rudimentary: it explains clearly that the common sense receives the external sensibles (like color, smell, etc) and “differentiate” (*fenbie* 分別) them, but does not mention the common sensibles (like motion, rest, etc). Yet, it suggests that common sense operates also on a second level, that is to say, the external sense of vision perceives color (first level), and the common sense perceives the sight of color (second level).

Yet, the *Lingyan lishao* departed from the Coimbra commentary, identifying the second inner sense with the cogitative (*sisi* 思司) and not with *phantasia*. In other words, while the Coimbra commentary subsumes the cogitative power under the general term of *phantasia*, the *Lingyan lishao* takes exactly the opposite stance, subsuming *phantasia* under the cogitative power. Perhaps the authors of the *Lingyan lishao* worried that the notion of *phantasia* or imagination appeared to the Chinese intellectuals too elusive, evanescent and unreal, something like the illusions discussed by the Buddhists. Or perhaps they wanted to emphasize further their project of building a theory of perception not for animals in general, but for human beings because only the latter can cogitate. In the chart below, one can clearly see the differences between the positions of the *Summa theologica*, the Coimbra commentary and the *Lingyan lishao*:

³⁷ Liber III, c. 3, q. 1, a. 3, 306: “Deinde obstant hae rationes: primum, quia diverso modo immutatur sensus communis & phantasia: nam ille immediatè à sensibus externis immutatur; haec non nisi mediatè, & interventu illius. Item, ille praesentia duntaxat obiecta, ac simul cum sensibus externis apprehendit; haec etiam iis cessantibus, & remotissima percipit. Ille tantum sensata; haec etiam non sensata dignoscit, administratque; alias functiones sibi peculiares de quibus supra.”

³⁸ Carvalho, “Introdução Geral,” in *Comentários de Colégio Conimbricense da Companhia de Jesus, Sobre os três livros de Tratado Da Alma de Aristóteles Estagirita* (Lisboa : Edições Silabo, 2010), 110.

<i>Summa theologiae</i> 3 or 4 inner senses	Coimbra commentary 2 inner senses	<i>Lingyan lishao</i> 2 inner senses
Common sense	Common sense	Common sense
<i>Phantasia</i>	<i>Phantasia</i> , including:	Cogitative power, including:
Estimative power and memorative power	– Estimative power or cogitative in case of human beings – Memory	– Storing the sensibles 主藏所收五司 – Knowing the intention 曉達之意 – Storing the intentions 主藏所收諸物之意

Besides the two inner senses, the sensitive soul also has an appetitive sense (*shisi* 嗜司) with concupiscible (*yuneng* 欲能) and irascible powers (*nuneng* 怒能).³⁹ A note states that the two powers are complementary: “Anger is not the opposite of pleasure; for example, the anger born out of the irascible power of the grass and plants is called effort.”⁴⁰ Indeed, the *Lingyan lishao* inherits here from the revalorization of the appetitive sense, or passions of the soul, that we can see in the Coimbra commentary, considering that they have a physical basis legitimizing them as something positive.⁴¹

Treatise on memory

After having very briefly introduced the three powers of the intellective soul (*jihan* 記含 or memory, *mingwu* 明悟 or intellect, and *aiyu* 愛欲 or will), the *Lingyan lishao* has a long discussion on memory as an independent power. Aristotle did not treat specifically about memory in the *De Anima*. However, in the section “Memory and reminiscence” of the *Parva Naturalia*, he stated that “memory belongs accidentally to the intellect, and essentially it belongs to the primary capacity of sense-perception.”⁴² As we can see, Aristotle treated memory not as a power of the intellective soul, but essentially as a power of the sensitive soul. That memory was later on considered in the West a power of the intellective soul is mostly due to Saint Augustine, who talked about memory, intellect and will as being inscribed in the human soul as a sign of the Trinity.⁴³ Pierre Lombard and Albert the Great interpreted memory, intellect and will as three powers in the soul. Though Aquinas treated memory as a

³⁹ ST Ia q. 80 and 81; Coimbra, Liber III, c. 13, q.1. a. 1-3, 415-418.

⁴⁰ LYLS, 390: 怒非喜之對，如草木怒生之怒，言其敢也。

⁴¹ See Carvalho, “Imaginação, pensamento e conhecimento de si,” 35

⁴² See Thomas Kjeller Johansen, *The Powers of Aristotle's Soul* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012), 203.

⁴³ See *Sermo* 52; *De Trinitate*, IX, X, XIV.

power of the intellective soul, he did not see it as an independent power, but he considered that the intellective soul has only two powers, the will and the intellect, with memory being included within the intellect.⁴⁴

Ignatius of Loyola in the *Spiritual Exercises* makes reference to the three powers of the soul, and Ricci in the *Real Meaning of the Lord of Heaven* followed the Augustinian tradition. However, like Aquinas, he subsumed memory under the intellect: “If the will and the intellect are complete, then memory will be also complete by itself; therefore, academic discourses mention only two.”⁴⁵ Indeed, the Jesuit curriculum was shaped by the ideas of Aquinas, and thus the Jesuit treatises on the soul usually follow the dual division of Aquinas. In his *Western mnemotechnics* (*Xiguojiifa* 西國記法), Ricci presented also some general ideas about the nature of memory, and he indicated that sensitive memory is located in the rear part of the brain (*luxinhou* 顱頤後).⁴⁶ We have an indication on the dependence of *Lingyan lishao* over this work because we can read the same thing with the exact Chinese translation. The idea itself can be traced back to Galen.⁴⁷

We may be puzzled by the long discussion about memory since there is no specific treatment of the question in the Coimbra commentary of the *De Anima*. Even though the discussion on memory is under the heading of the intellective soul, the *Lingyan lishao* discusses first the sensitive memory common to all animals, which belongs to the sensitive soul, and then it discusses the rational memory proper to human beings and to the intellective soul. As Duceux remarked, “the examination of the memory allows establishing a transition between the sensitive and irrational soul, and the intellective soul.”⁴⁸ She also indicated many parallels between the treatise on the memory in the *Lingyan lishao* and the *Summa theologia*.

However, the direct source for this treatise on memory is not the *Summa theologia* nor the Coimbra commentary on the *De Anima*, but the Coimbra commentary on the *Parva Naturalia* (1592). This is not surprising since the Scholastics considered the *Parva Naturalia* as a companion to the *De Anima*. As Professor Vincent Shen showed, Sambiasi translated two other sections of the *Parva Naturalia*, “On Sleep” (*De somno et vigilia*) and “On Dreams” (*De insomniis*), which are also based on the Coimbra commentary on the *Parva Naturalia*.⁴⁹

⁴⁴ ST Ia, q. 79, a. 7.

⁴⁵ Matteo Ricci, *Le sens réel de Seigneur du Ciel*, c. 7, n. 450, edited and translated in French by Thierry Meynard (Paris: Belles Lettres, 2013), 198: 又其司愛、司明者已成，其司記者自成矣，故講學只論其二爾已。

⁴⁶ Zhu Weizheng ed., *Limadou zhongwen wenji*, 143.

⁴⁷ Duceux, 101.

⁴⁸ Duceux, 97.

⁴⁹ See Vincent Shen Qingsong, 沈清松 “Yalishiduode linghun lilun de qianxi heqi

According to the *Lingyan lishao* and the Coimbra commentary on the *Parva Naturalia*, sensitive memory has three dimensions: to record (*ji* 記; *pro ipsa facultates eupotentia, quâ recordamur*), to memorize (*jigong* 記功; *pro recordandi actu*) and to repeat (*xixiang* 習像; *pro habitu, seu imaginibus, quarum interventu memoranda actus exercetur*).⁵⁰ The Chinese text follows closely those three sections of the Coimbra commentary, with a focus on the first dimension of recording.

Concerning this first dimension, the *Lingyan lishao* explains in some details the process of dematerialization, starting with material sensible objects which leave their immaterial imprint on memory: “What is received is not the reality of the objects but their images (*xiang* 像).”⁵¹ It distinguishes also between the sensitive memory and the rational memory. The former is common to animals and human beings, and are given a few examples of it in the animals. However, some animals like mollusks (*hao* 螯, *conchylia*) and worms (*chongqu* 蟲蛆, *lumbrici*) are deprived from it.⁵²

Human beings have both sensitive and rational memories, the latter being proper only to human beings. When they die, sensitive memory loses its corporeal basis and disappears, but the rational memory preserves the “things [recorded] while alive” (*shengtianzhishi* 生前之事). As we can gather from the Coimbra commentary on the *Parva Naturalia*, the *Lingyan lishao* discusses here the case of the separated soul (*separata anima*) after death. The soul does not remember all the singulars (*zhuan* 專), but remembers universals (*zong* 綜).⁵³ The sensitive memory has a corporeal basis in the rear part of the brain, as I have said. However, the rational memory, like the other two powers of the soul (will and intellect), has no corporeal basis, and relies only on the substance of the immaterial soul.

The recording of the soul exists only as a potential, and thus needs to be actuated. This is the second dimension of memory, as act, that the *Lingyan lishao* analyzes in two operations (*gong* 功): remembering (*yiji* 憶記) and

zaoqide zhongguoshi de chanshi 亞里斯多德靈魂理論的遷徙和早期的中國式闡釋” [The Migration of Aristotle’s Theory of Soul to China and it’s Earlier Chinese Interpretations], in *Xixuedongjian yanjiu* 西學東漸研究 (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2010), 80. See also Dong Shaoxin 董少新, *Xingshen zhijian* 形神之間——早期西洋醫學入華史稿 [In between body and spirit; history of the early introduction of Western medicine in China] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2008).

⁵⁰ “In Librum de memoria et reminiscencia,” in *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, In quatuor libros De coelo, Meteorologicos, De parva naturalia, & Ethica* (Lyon: Horatius Cardon, 1608), 1, column 1.

⁵¹ LYLS, 392.

⁵² “In Librum de memoria et reminiscencia,” column 7.

⁵³ “In Librum de memoria et reminiscencia,” columns 3-4.

inference (*tuiji* 推記).⁵⁴ After death, remembering can still function, but inference stops since it is not fed by images. Inference itself is a complex process, analyzed in three steps.⁵⁵ Following the Coimbra commentary, the *Lingyan lishao* states that most animals remember through their sensitive memory, but cannot make inference. However, Plutarch did not share this view, affirming that animals are able to make inference, as it can be seen with two examples. The first example is about a fox approaching ice: hearing water flowing under the ice, it knows there is danger and stops advancing. In the second example from Plutarch, the hunting hound pursues a rabbit and, arriving on a crossroad with three paths and not smelling anything at the first and second paths, it proceeds by elimination and knows that the rabbit has taken the third path.⁵⁶ However, the Coimbra Jesuits and the *Lingyan lishao* consider Plutarch's opinion incorrect because, in the case of the fox, it was remembering (*fujì* 復記) a past experience, and in the second case, animals behave following their natural instinct (*ziranzhineng* 自然之能).

Finally, the *Lingyan lishao* deals with the third dimension of memory, that is, the practical use. The mnemotechnics are introduced with an implicit reference to Ricci's *Xiguojifa*, a work mentioned above. Also we find the examples of Mithrydates, king of Pontus, who could speak twenty-two languages, and of Cyrus, king of Persia, who could remember the names of his four hundred thousand soldiers. Both examples are taken from the Coimbra commentary.⁵⁷

As I indicated, the *Lingyan lishao* discusses on memory under the heading of intellective soul. However, the discussion on whether all animals, including mollusks and worms, have sensitive memory seem irrelevant to the subject of the intellective soul. This is because the *Lingyan lishao* took this development on memory from the section "Memory and Reminiscence" in the Coimbra commentary on the *Parva Naturalia*. Also, the authors of the *Lingyan lishao* probably considered this insertion about the power of memory strategically important, since it could attract the attention of the Chinese literati preparing themselves for imperial examinations. However, even more importantly, memory takes an important function in remembering the graces received from God.

⁵⁴ The Latin concept of *reminiscentia*, often translated in English as reminiscence, is quite ambiguous, but Sambiasi chose with *tuiji* a Chinese rendering which is non ambiguous.

⁵⁵ LYLS, 394; "In Librum de memoria et reminiscentia," column 11.

⁵⁶ "In Librum de memoria et reminiscentia," column 12.

⁵⁷ "In Librum de memoria et reminiscentia," column 15.

The intellect

Aristotle discussed together the agent and patient intellects in chapters 4 and 5 of the Third Book of the *De Anima*. Then, in chapters 6, 7 and 8 of the same Book, he discussed specifically on the patient intellect. For better clarity, the Coimbra commentary discuss separately on the two intellects. It examines through six questions the agent intellect, “which is first by nature and function,” and then examines the patient intellect through eight questions.⁵⁸ There is an overlap since the first question on the agent intellect discusses its difference with the patient intellect. In his rendering, the *Lingyan lishao* focuses mostly on the agent intellect, and does not present a systematic rendering of the patient intellect, as we have in the Coimbra commentary.⁵⁹ The *Lingyan lishao* gives a list of eight characteristics of the intellect. The first is being differentiated as agent and patient. The *Lingyan lishao* insists on the different functions of the two intellects:

The agent intellect produces (*zuo* 作) all the images in order to help (*zhu* 助) the function of the passive intellect, which then adds light to the images, understands all the objects and obtains their principle (*li* 理); the agent intellect makes possible for principles to be obtained, and the patient intellect obtains them.⁶⁰

Here, the agent intellect is described as “help” for the patient intellect,⁶¹ a relationship expressed in the Coimbra commentary as “almost as a helper”

⁵⁸ Coimbra commentary, Liber III, c. 5, q. 1, a. 1, 320: “Duobus capitibus superiori-bus egit Aristoteles partim de intellectu possibili, partim de agente, rursusque de possibili disseret iis tribus, quae proxime sequuntur. Nos ad maiorem doctrinae perspicuitatem de agente, qui natura & officio prior est, hoc loco disputabimus, postea verò separatim de possibili.”

⁵⁹ The Coimbra commentary deals with the agent intellect through the particular problem of the realization of the intellection: how the agent intellect acts positively, transmitting the intellectual species of the things (*simulacra rerum intelligibilium*) to the patient intellect in order to realize the intellection. Coimbra, Lib III, c. 5, 318: “Accedit nunc ad investigationem contemplationemque alterius intellectus, quem agentem vocant, quod eius officium non sit pati, sed agere duntaxat transmittendo rerum intellegibilium simulacra, seu species in patientem ad intellectionem perficiendam.”

⁶⁰ LYLS, 396: 作明悟者，作萬像以助受明悟之功；受明悟者，遂加之光明，悟萬物而得其理。作者能為可得；受者所以得之也。

⁶¹ This important relationship of subordination of the active intellect towards the patient intellect has eluded the translation by Duceux. We believe that she mistranslated here, inverting the relationship between the two intellects: Duceux: “El entendimiento activo pone en acto todas la imágenes mediante la ayuda del trabajo del entendimiento pasivo” (463).

(*quasi administer*). According to the Aristotelian principle of the superiority of the agent over the patient, the agent intellect should be placed above the patient intellect.⁶² However, as the Coimbra commentary explains, this principle should not be taken as something absolute: if we consider the functions of both intellects, we should prefer the patient intellect to the active intellect, because the function of thinking, which is the highest human achievement, belongs in fact to the patient intellect and not to the agent intellect.⁶³ In terms of practical realization, the concrete understanding happening in the patient intellect is the ultimate finality, and therefore it ranks higher than the theoretical function of illumination by the agent intellect. This valorization of the thinking activity is indeed an important feature of both the Coimbra commentary and the *Lingyan lishao*.⁶⁴ Nonetheless, the absolute necessity of the agent intellect is also clearly expressed: “Why there could not be a single intellect?” It is answered that the intellect cannot understand the materiality of an object, but needs to discard it in order to know it. This echoes the Coimbra commentary.⁶⁵

In the case of a material object, the *Lingyan lishao* describes the four steps for understanding: first, from the material object, the vision abstracts its material image (*wuxiang* 物像); second, the image enters the common sense, detaches itself from matter and becomes a sensitive image (*xingxiang* 形像), also called a particular image (*zhuanxiang* 專像); third, the image enters the cogitative power as a singular image, differentiated from the images of other objects in virtue of their material connection; finally, the image joins (*gui* 歸) the agent intellect and loses all materiality and singularity, being an intelligible universal (*gonggongzhe* 公共者), also called spiritual image (*lingxiang* 靈像). The use of the word *gui* is quite ambiguous since it may suggest that intellectual species return to the agent intellect as if they would have existed before the act of perception. Such reading would

⁶² Aristotle, *De Anima* 430a17-18, translated by R. D. Hicks, Cambridge University Press, 1907, 135: “For that which acts is always superior to that which is acted upon, the cause or principle to the matter.”

⁶³ Coimbra, Liber III, c. 5, q. 1, a. 3, 326: “Itaque si intellectus agens, quatenus species intelligibiles in patientem producit; patiens verò prout eas recipiendo patitur, absolutè spectetur, haud dubie sub ea praecisè consideratione anteposendus est intellectus agens patienti. Verùm id non obstat quominus patiens, si secundum proprias actiones quas edit, expendantur agenti simpliciter praeferri debeat.”

⁶⁴ From the point of view of generation, the order is reversed; LYLS, 396: “The principle is that there is first an agent intellect producing intelligible [species], and then there is a patient intellect which understands them, and thus understanding follows” (其緣則先有作者為可明，次有受者明之，則遂明矣). The agent intellect is considered as an efficient cause for understanding, and comes logically prior to the patient intellect.

⁶⁵ LYLS, 396; Coimbra commentary, Liber III, c. 5, q. 3, a. 1, 321.

make the intellectual species similar to the ideas of Plato. In fact, the verb *gui* means here to join, indicating that the images with the agent intellect produce together the intellectual species. As the Coimbra commentary states, “nothing prevents the intellect to associate itself indiscriminately with all the images in order to produce the intelligible species.”⁶⁶

Compared to the account by Aquinas, this four-step account is quite elaborated.⁶⁷ In the process, we are not surprised to see the roles played by the external sense, the common sense and the agent intellect. Yet, the *Lingyan lishao* also inserts also the role of the cogitative power in the formation of intelligible species. In this way it follows the Coimbra commentary which traces back to the Dominican theologian and cardinal Thomas Cajetan (1469-1534) the idea that “the cogitative power expresses the corresponding image of a singular substance.”⁶⁸ The Coimbra commentary argues: “We do not believe that the cogitative, when it first receives the species of the accident, draws immediately an image of a latent substance expressed in it, but we do believe that it first apprehends this accident, and then, from such a pre-knowledge, enters in the knowledge of the substance.”⁶⁹ In other word, the knowledge of this particular thing belongs to the cogitative power, that is, to the sensitive power. From there, through the agent intellect, the intellectual power draws the knowledge of a substance detached from any singularity.

After having stated that all the species of the material substances are produced by the agent intellect, the Coimbra commentary mentions

⁶⁶ Coimbra commentary, Liber III, c. 5, q. 5, a. 1, 346: “At nihil impedit quominus intellectus cum omnibus phantasmatis indiscriminatim iungi queat ad species intelligibiles producendas.”

⁶⁷ Aquinas: “Since Aristotle did not allow that forms of natural things exist apart from matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible; it follows that the natures of forms of the sensible things which we understand are not actually intelligible. Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act; as the senses are made actual by what is actually sensible. We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the species from material conditions. And such is the necessity for an active intellect.” (Ia, q. 79, a. 3, resp.); and: “Wherefore we must say that in the soul is some power derived from a higher intellect, whereby it is able to light up the phantasms. And we know this by experience, since we perceive that we abstract universal forms from their particular conditions, which is to make them actually intelligible” (Ia, q. 79, a. 4, resp.).

⁶⁸ Coimbra, Liber III, c. 5, q. 5, a. 1, 347: “Caietanus 3, part. quaest. 76, artic. 7 aliique nonnulli putant vim cogitatricem hominis, quam nos à phantasia non distinguimus, proprium exprimere idolum singularis substantiae.”

⁶⁹ Coimbra, Liber III, c. 5, q. 5, a. 2, 347: “Non credimus tamen cogitativam ut primùm recipit speciem accidentis confestim elicere expressam imaginem latentis in eo substantiae; sed primo agressu apprehendere tale accidens; deinde ex illius praenotione in substantiae notitiam penetrare.”

further that it is also true about the accidents of the material substances, like quantity, quality, relation, place, time, posture, condition, action and affection, according to the categories of Aristotle. The *Lingyan lishao* takes the relation “the totality is bigger than its part,” and it illustrates it with the example of a material object, a wooden scale. It adopts here the same process of production of the intellectual species in four steps: the vision apprehends the material image in terms of foot (*chi* 尺) and inch (*cun* 寸); the common sense draws out of the matter a sensitive image and stores it; the cogitative power draws the abstract quantities of foot and inch; and finally, the agent intellect makes abstraction of the concrete measurements and draws a formal relation between the totality and its part. The point being made is that the accidents of a material substance are not directly known by the five external senses or by the two inner senses (common sense and cogitative power), but there is a need for an active principle of understanding, the agent intellect, in order to produce intelligible species in the mind. An example here is the formal relation between the totality and its part. The *Lingyan lishao* calls what is obtained by the agent intellect “a subtle and exquisite penetration” (*weimiao xuanton* 微妙玄通), using an expression found in the *Daodejing* about the masters of the Dao.⁷⁰ Thus, the agent intellect alone knows what is common, great and general (*gong* 公, *da* 大, *zong* 總).

The *Lingyan lishao* continues further with the category of quality, taking an example of the white color. It explains the role of the agent intellect as something potential, providing the intelligible species of whiteness. For the actual understanding of white to occur, the patient intellect is needed. The *Lingyan lishao* insists on the complementary functions of the agent and patient intellects in realizing concrete understanding, and it uses the metaphor of the clepsydra.

The *Lingyan lishao* explains the role of the agent intellect as an illumination, which produces actual understanding in the patient intellect. This agrees with Aristotle and Aquinas.⁷¹ Similarly, the Coimbra commentary discusses the three functions of the agent intellect: to illuminate the sensitive representations (*illustrare phanasmata*); to actualize the intellectual object (*efficere objectum intelligibile actu*); and to produce the intelligible species in the patient intellect (*producere in intellectum patientem species*

⁷⁰ *Daodejing* 15 (translation James Legge): “The skillful masters (of the Dao) in old times, with a subtle and exquisite penetration, comprehended its mysteries, and were deep (also) so as to elude men’s knowledge” (古之善為士者，微妙玄通，深不可識).

⁷¹ Aristotle, *De Anima* III, c.5, 430a16; Aquinas, *A commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima*, translated by Robert Pasnau, Yale University Press, 1999, chapter 10, 43-53, 365-366; ST, Ia, q. 79, a. 3, obj. 2.

intelligibiles).⁷² The Coimbra commentary also introduces a more innovative theory about the effective illumination as a way to supersede Aquinas's radical illumination theory, but the *Lingyan lishao* did not develop this new theory.⁷³

The *Lingyan lishao* has so far described the first characteristic of the intellect as being made of the agent and patient intellects. The other seven characteristics are more succinct. The second is that the agent intellect belongs to the intellectual power of the soul. Third, not only does the agent intellect produce intelligible species of material substances, but also it plays a role in forming the intelligible species of immaterial substances. Fourth, the intellect knows the external and material objects, and also knows itself. Self-understanding is not based on any external sense, and the intellect can be compared to a spiritual eye (*shenmu* 神目), which is able to understand all things and also oneself. The understanding of the self is extraordinary in two ways: it is obtained only when the self reflects upon itself, and therefore it is not constant; also, because the soul is found in a body, and therefore mixed with corporal elements, it is impossible for self-reflection to be completely pure.

The fifth characteristic of the intellect is to operate on the basis of the images, or species, of the objects. The patient intellect needs to receive the intelligible species or rational images (*lingxiang* 靈像). Three reasons are given: just as sensation needs objects to be sensed, similarly intellection needs intelligible objects; the intellect may grasp some objects but still needs to know in what category they belong, and therefore what their intelligible species is; the cogitative power provides singular images or species, which are in fact external to the mind. The mind still needs an inner cause to move, and this is found in the mind itself, in the intelligible species. The philosophers (*gewuzhijia* 格物之家) distinguish four degrees (*sideng* 四等) for the images: sensitive images associated with the five senses, sensitive images associated with the common sense, intellectual images in human

⁷² See Coimbra, Liber III, c. 5, q. 1, a. 1, 321.

⁷³ Coimbra, Liber III, c. 5, q. 2, a. 1, 329: "It is not as if the agent intellect impresses some kind of light, but like an external light and with the help of its ray, it actively raises the phantasmata in producing intelligible species, in which the common nature is represented without individual differences and remains known by the intellect alone" (Non quasi intellectus agens aliquid luminis phantasmatis imprimat; sed quia tanquam externa lux radii sui consortio activè elevat phantasmata ad producendam speciem intelligibilem, in qua communis natura repraesentatur exuta differentiis individualibus, manetque à solo intellectu perceptibilis). See Carvalho, *Psicologia e Ética no Curso Jesuíta Conimbricense* (Lisboa: Edições Colibri, 2010), 88-89.

beings and intellectual images in angels. Verhaeren showed long time ago that this passage depends on the Coimbra commentary.⁷⁴

The sixth characteristic is that the intellect is not located on a material place, and thus immortal. The seventh is that it shares similarities with the senses. The final characteristic of the intellect is to perform three functions: direct apprehension (*zhitong* 直通), composition (*hetong* 合通) and deduction (*tuitong* 推通).⁷⁵

The will

In the last chapters of *De Anima*, Aristotle discusses the question of the appetitive power in living beings, but there is no specific treatment of the question of the human will, which is discussed in his works on ethics. At the end of the Coimbra commentary (*Liber III*, c. 13, q. 1-3), there is a succinct discussion on human will, probably inserted here as a preparation for their volume on Ethics. However, compared to the Coimbra commentary, the *Lingyan lishao* presents to us a much more elaborated treatment, in ten points.

The first point establishes the difference between the natural, sensitive and rational desires (*xingyu* 性欲, *siyu* 司欲, *lingyu* 靈欲), which have respectively for objects: the convenient, the pleasure and the just (*yi* 宜, *xingle* 形樂, *yi* 義). However, the main difference is between necessity and freedom:

As Saint Thomas says, animals are acted upon more than they act; they do not control themselves. Concerning human beings, they pursue a desire, discard it, or hesitate whether to pursue it or not, without resolution. If they have some control over themselves, it is because they are endowed with a rational desire to direct them. This is not out of their natural constitution, and thus they have only a shadow of self-control. Some people may have a very first desire (*zuichuyiyu* 最初一欲) and, not taking time to reflect and discern, they are moved and immediately act. Even though their desire may be rational, because they did not use their intellect, they cannot be blamed. Children have desire but cannot use their intellect. Mad people have also the intellect impaired by their illness. In those three cases, there is no self-control.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Coimbra, *Liber III*, c.5, q.3, a.2, 335: “Porrò quibusdam veluti gradibus ascendunt species...”

⁷⁵ See Coimbra, *Liber III*, c.6, 354-357.

⁷⁶ LYLS, 334: 故聖多瑪斯曰：禽獸所行，不可謂行，可謂被行，不能自制之謂也。其在於人，一見可欲，或直從之，或擇去之，或從否之間，虛懸未定。如是者，稍似自制，實則稟於靈欲以使其然，非由本質，蓋乃自制之彰耳。又人最初一欲，不待思辨，觸之

As Duceux rightly points out, the Chinese text refers here to the question of voluntary act as defined by Aquinas in the *Summa theologiae*. However, in her introduction, she identifies the term “very first desire” to the fundamental desire for happiness.⁷⁷ In fact, this passage translates almost word by word from the Coimbra commentary. From there, we can know that the term refers to what the theologians call “*primo primi*,” that is, impulsive acts, which are therefore involuntary.⁷⁸ Both texts give the same three examples.

The next two points (the desire as one of the three powers of the soul, and desire as either loving or hating an object) are treated briefly. The fourth point deals with the central idea of auto determination (*zizhuan* 自專), or free will (*liberum arbitrium*): only human beings have rational desires in the sense that the intellect understands and examines the desired object, and then the will freely decides. On the next point, the division of work between intellect and will implies that the desire does not understand itself, since understanding comes from the intellect.

Point six states that the intellect and memory receive external influences and are somehow forced, without being able to resist. However, the will is different: it is the place of human freedom and cannot be coerced. The *Lingyan lishao* gives two examples linked to religious freedom: the extreme violence against Christian martyrs cannot bend their will, and a tyrant cannot force people to worship idols. Related to the question of human freedom, the *Lingyan lishao* discusses in what sense God sends His grace and yet let people free to decide. Duceux notices that the *Lingyan lishao* does not mention the difference between habitual grace and actual grace, but, within the category of actual grace, it introduces a distinction between sufficient grace and efficient grace. This distinction is not found in Augustine or Aquinas, but in the theological thought of the Sixteenth century and linked to the question of justification. Quite significantly, Duceux suggests that the articulation between sufficient grace and efficient grace in the *Lingyan*

即發者，雖屬靈欲，而靈未用事，若者不得為罪。嬰兒有欲，靈亦未用。病失心者，靈為病阻。三者亦皆不能自制之類也。

⁷⁷ Duceux, 153. Also, she translates *benzhi* 本質 as material naturalness (509), but I think it is incorrect.

⁷⁸ Coimbra, Liber III, c.13, q.1, a.3, 417: “Bruta, ut D. Damascenus lib. 2 Fidei orthodoxae Cap. 27, inquit, potius aguntur, quàm agunt. Adverte tamen quosdam esse actus voluntatis, quos Theologi vocant primò primos, qui tametsi non nisi praeunte cognitione exercentur; quia tamen non liberum, sed subitum, ac necessarium rationis iudicium sequuntur, liberi non sunt, neque in nostra potestate est eos suspendere, quod similiter dicendum est de iis, quos pueri, & amentes, ac caeteri, quibus rationis usus impeditus est, administrant.” Interestingly, Sambiasi chose not to introduce the name of Damascene, but he referred the quote to Aquinas.

lishao reflects the ideas expressed by the Spanish Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina (1535-1600) in his *Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis* (1588), written during his stay in Portugal (1584-1591). The ideas of Molina were certainly known by Manuel de Gois, though not present in the Coimbra commentary on the *De Anima*. Duceux makes the very probable hypothesis that Sambiasi knew about those ideas during his studies in Europe.⁷⁹

Point eight discusses the will as having for object the understanding of the good. Point nine states that understanding the perfect good results automatically in loving it. Paradoxically, this automatic act of the will, not determined by the self, is also the act with the highest degree of freedom.

The final point (10) discusses whether the intellect or the will is the most important power of the soul. Three positions are listed: some say that the intellect and the will are like twin sisters (*luansheng jiemei* 孿生姊妹); for Aristotle, nothing can be purely equal and thus there should be a hierarchy; for Augustine, since the three powers of the soul are based on the substance of the soul, they hold equal dignity. The *Lingyan lishao* translates almost *vebartim* this section from the Coimbra commentary.⁸⁰ The three arguments of authority mentioned above are followed by a rational argument on three grounds, also drawn from the Coimbra text: practiced virtue (*suoxizhide* 所習之德 or *habitus*), action (*suoxingzhixing* 所行之行 or *actus*) and object (*qisuoxiangzhixiang* 其所向之向 or *objecta*). First, the practiced virtue of the will is *ren* 仁, while the practiced value of the intellective power is *zhi* 智. In the rank of Confucian values, *ren* comes above *zhi*, and therefore the will ranks higher than the intellect.⁸¹ Second, in terms of action, the intellect is moved by external objects, but the will is moved only by itself. Since it is better to move than to be moved, the will ranks also higher.⁸² Also, the

⁷⁹ Duceux, 167.

⁸⁰ LYLS, 408; Coimbra, Liber III, c.13, q.2, a.1, 423: “Fuere, qui voluntatem, & intellectricem potentiam quasi duos sorores eodem partu editas, parique nobilitate insignes putarint. Sed hos refellit Aristotelis, & aliorum philosophorum... Nec nobis adversatur Divus Augustinus Lib. 10. De Trinitate cap. 11...”

⁸¹ Coimbra, Liber III, c.13, q.2, a.1, 423: “At charitas, quae est habitus voluntatis tum sapientiae, tum caeteris animae ornamentis ac donis excellit, ut testatur non solum idem Doctor in De Trinitate. cap. 19, sed etiam Divus Paulus primae ad Corinth. 13 & ad Colossens. 3.” For Aristotle, intellect ranks the highest. The *Lingyan lishao* took from the *Tianzhu shiyi* the idea of associating the powers of the soul to Confucian virtues. Indeed, Ricci associated the couple will-intellect to the couple *ren-yi* 仁義 (benevolence-rightness), which is mentioned 27 times in the *Mencius*. Matteo Ricci, *Le sens réel de Seigneur du Ciel*, c. 7, n. 451, 199. However, the Chinese meaning of *yi* is quite far away from the Western notion of intellect. Thus, the *Lingyan lishao* addresses the problem by judiciously replacing *yi* by *zhi* (wisdom).

⁸² Coimbra, Liber III, c.13, q.2, a.1, 423: “Perfectius est movere quàm moveri.”

intellect enlightens people about what happiness is, but only the will makes them to obtain happiness.⁸³ A counter-argument is also given in a form of a rhetorical question: what is a worst evil, not to know virtuous actions, or to hate virtuous actions?⁸⁴ Finally, in terms of object, the will tends to the perfect good (*quanmeihao* 全美好), while the intellect tends to the truth, which is a particular good (*fenmeihao* 分美好).⁸⁵

In brief, this section offers a philosophical presentation on the question of the will, but yet it introduces also the theological theme of the relation between human freedom and grace. This theme is not usually treated in the philosophical treatise on the soul. As I have shown above, the characteristics of the soul as being created and depending on grace were not included in the standard treatise on the soul, but were added by the Coimbra Jesuits, and thus are also present in the *Lingyan lishao*. In a similar way, Jesuits in Europe and China added also to their treatise on the soul a discussion on the will.

The likeness of the soul with God

After the mostly philosophical discussion of the soul in itself in its first *juan*, the *Lingyan lishao* discusses in the second *juan* about its relation to God. There are two sections. The first is entitled: “Dignity of the soul and its likeness to God” (*lun yanimazhizun yu Tianzhu xiangsi* 論亞尼瑪之尊與天主相似). It shows precisely that by sharing three types of likeness with God, in terms of nature, modeling and operation, the soul acquires its dignity. In the Bible, *Genesis* introduces the important idea of human being created by God as his image and likeness: “Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness.”⁸⁶ Augustine considered that there is a difference between the two terms of image and likeness, and in the *Summa theologia*, Aquinas developed further the distinction, stressing the importance of likeness:

⁸³ Coimbra, Liber III, c.13, q.2, a.1, 424: “At amore, qui est actus voluntatis, redditur homo simpliciter bonus, non autem cognition, quae est actus intellectus; ut enim D. Augustinus 11 de Civitate Dei, cap. 28, sapienter ait : Vir bonus non dicitur, qui scit id, quod bonum est, sed diligit.”

⁸⁴ LYLES, 409: 明悟之反為不知, 愛欲之反為惡。人之不知德行, 方於人之惡德行, 其惡孰重? See Coimbra, Liber III, c.13, q.2, a.1, 424: “Ea sunt meliora, quorum corruptentia deteriora sunt, oppositum verò amoris peius est, magisque fugiendum, quàm oppositum cognitionis, ut patet in odio Dei, & eiusdem ignorance: quippe multo detestabilius est Deum odisse, quàm ignorare.”

⁸⁵ Coimbra, Liber III, c.13, q.2, a.1, 424: “Quia id, in quod voluntas fertur, est ipsum bonum absolutè sumptum & perfectum, atque ultimus finis; obiectum autem intellectus est bonum quoddam particulare, nempe verum.”

⁸⁶ Genesis 1: 26, NRSV translation.

Hence it is clear that likeness (*similitudo*) is essential to an image (*imago*); and that an image adds something to likeness---namely, that it is copied from something else. For an “image” is so called because it is produced as an imitation of something else; wherefore, for instance, an egg, however much like and equal to another egg, is not called an image of the other egg, because it is not copied from it. (Ia, q. 93, a.1, resp.)

Therefore, there is something more substantial in the image than in likeness, establishing the idea that human beings are produced by God. Aquinas states further that likeness should be in species, that is, concerned with some specific qualities shared by God and human beings.⁸⁷ For Aquinas, there are different degrees of likeness:

Since likeness is based upon agreement (*convenientia*) or communication (*communicatio*) in form, it varies according to the many modes of communication in form. Some things are said to be like, which communicate in the same form (*forma*) according to the same formality (*ratio*), and according to the same mode (*modus*); and these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their likeness; as two things equally white are said to be alike in whiteness; and this is the most perfect likeness.⁸⁸

Because God and human beings belong to the same species of rational beings, there is a likeness according to the same formality, but not yet according to the same mode or measure, since human beings share only part of God’s reason, and so the likeness is imperfect.

The *Lingyan lishao* translates likeness as *xiangsi* 相似 and image as *yingxiang* 影像, without establishing a clear distinction between the two concepts. As the title of the section indicates, the focus is about the likeness of the human soul with God. The *Lingyan lishao* distinguishes three different kinds of likeness: according to nature (*xing* 性), to form (*mo* 模) and to operation (*xing* 行). These seem to correspond to Aquinas’ categories: *ratio*, *forma* and *modus*.⁸⁹ It seems, therefore, that the *Lingyan lishao* is inspired by the Thomistic treatment of the question, but the *Summa theologiae* cannot

⁸⁷ See ST Ia, q. 93, a.2, resp.

⁸⁸ ST Ia, q.4, a.3, resp.

⁸⁹ In the *Quaestio* 93 of the Prima pars, Aquinas discusses the notion of the image of God, and even though he does not explicitly discuss the question according to the framework of nature, form and operation, we can still find in its elaboration the three dimensions. Article 1 discusses likeness as a kind of ontology. The two following articles may not be very relevant for us, since article 2 discusses irrational creatures and article 3 discusses angels, subjects which are not explicitly discussed by the *Lingyan lishao*. Same as Article 1, Article 4 deploys an ontological discussion, developing the idea of the rational nature of the human soul. Then, Article 5 leaves the ontological frame, and discusses relations, more specifically the relations between the human soul and Trinity. Article 7 moves on discussing the human soul from the points of view of its operation.

be the direct and primary source because it does not propose the detailed list of twenty-five likenesses that we have in the *Lingyan lishao*: eight likenesses according to essence, seven according to form, and ten according to operation.

Different authors established a list of likenesses: Helinandus (c. 1160-c.1237), Cistercian monk of the monastery of Froidmont, listed seven likenesses of the soul with God; Bernardinus of Siena (1380-1444) claimed fourteen likenesses; and Antoninus of Florence (1389-1459) went up to twenty-seven, with three groups of nine (nine likenesses according to nature, nine according to the incarnation of Christ, and nine according to the supernatural). Most authors focused on the likeness of the soul with God, but others, like Antoninus of Florence, developed also the likeness of the soul with Christ, especially through sacramental life.⁹⁰ The *Lingyan lishao* does not mention the likeness of the soul with Christ probably because it prefers to build first an anthropology based on the Christian idea of God. At this early stage of the modern Catholic mission in China, Christology in Chinese language was not so much developed.

There are thus eight likenesses of the human soul with God according to their nature or essence. The first is about completeness (*benzimanzu* 本自滿足), meaning that the soul does not suffer corruption. There is a quote of Augustine, which can be traced to a passage of his *Treatise on the Gospel of John*.⁹¹ The second likeness is about soul's simplicity (*jichun* 極純), a likeness mentioned by other authors.⁹² Third, the soul shares spirituality (*chunshen* 純神) with God.⁹³ Same as God, the soul knows things not

⁹⁰ See Antoninus of Florence: "Imago incarnatae veritatis mediantibus virtutibus quae si naturae sunt, non a se habet, sed infusas a deo," *Summae sacrae theologiae*, Venice, 1632, 2a.

⁹¹ Augustine, *Evangelium Ioannis tractatus* VIII.2: "Then the soul will be restored to the image of the Creator, according to which image human being was made. What will be the power of the soul when the mortal body shall put on incorruptibility and immortality?" (Ubi etiam ad imaginem Creatoris sui renovatur, ad cuius imaginem factus est homo. Quid erit haec vis animae, cum et corpus hoc induerit incorruptionem, et mortale hoc induerit immortalitatem?)

⁹² Helinandus (Hélinand de Froimont), in *Chronicorum opus*, edited by Antoninus Florentinus, Lyon, 1586, 59-60, 2nd likeness: "Deus simplex est, et anima"; Bernardinus Senensis, *Opera omnia* (Venise, 1745), vol. 3, Dominica VI, Sermo XXXIX, 272, 7th likeness: "Quia sicut Deus est simplicissimus, & purus: ita anima"; Antoninus of Florence, 3rd: "Et anima nostra simplex et quantumad hoc, quia non est composita ex materia & forma, prout est homo ex corpore & anima, & alia corporalia."

⁹³ Helinandus 1st: "Deus spiritus est, et anima similiter"; Bernardinus Senensis, 5th: "Quia sicut Deus spiritus est, ita nostra anima est spiritus."; ST Ia, q.75, a.1, resp.

through perception (eyes), but through the spirit.⁹⁴ Fourth, soul has a supreme intelligence (*zhiling* 至靈).⁹⁵ The fifth likeness is unity (*weiyi* 惟一) of substance despite a variety of operations.⁹⁶

Next, God and the human soul are immortal (*busi* 不死). The difference is that God, being uncreated, is without beginning, while human soul is created, not extensive to eternity but immortal since the time of its creation. Early Christianity already held that the soul is immortal because it is immaterial. Augustine in his early writings was uncertain whether the soul was created from the beginning of the world, or in history. Later on, theologians unanimously held that the soul was created in history, and this is the view represented here. For example, Aquinas distinguishes eternity to which God belongs from *aevum* to which human beings belong.⁹⁷

Seventh likeness: God is present everywhere; similarly, human beings can go wherever they wish on earth (*wubukezai* 無不可在). The eight and

⁹⁴ ST Ia, q. 14, a.5, resp: “Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself, and in another. A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to the knowable object; as when the eye sees a man through the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of that which contains it; as when a part is seen in the whole by the image of the whole; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in the mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in another. So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other things not in themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the likeness of things other than Himself.” See also ST Ia, q. 89, a.1, resp; Ia, q.89, a.3, resp.

⁹⁵ Helinandus 7th: “Postremo Deus rationalis est vel potius ratio; anima similiter est rationalis”; Bernardinus Senensis, 4th : “quia sicut Deus est pure rationalis; ita homo est animal rationale.” Duceux considers this as a second aspect of the spirituality, but the connection seems not very clear to me.

⁹⁶ Bernardinus Senensis, 13th : “quia sicut Deus stans in toto mundo, omnia vario modo ornat; ita anima stando in corpore, variat diversimode membra, dando unicuique membro varias, & mirabiles operationes...”; ST Ia, q.11, a.3, resp: “Thirdly, this is shown from the unity of the world. For all things that exist are seen to be ordered to each other since some serve others. But things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same order, unless they are ordered thereto by one. For many are reduced into one order by one better than by many: because one is the ‘per se’ cause of one, and many are only the accidental cause of one, inasmuch as they are in some way one. Since therefore what is first is most perfect, and is so ‘per se’ and not accidentally, it must be that the first which reduces all into one order should be only one. And this one is God.”

⁹⁷ Cf. ST Ia q.10, a.5. Helinandus 3th: “Deus immortalis est, et anima”; Bernardinus Sinensis 6th: “Quia sicut Deus est interminabilis, & infinibilis; ita anima, liceat habeat principium, numquam habet finem.” Antoninus of Florence affirms the immortality of the soul in substance, but he notes that the soul of the sinner can still die in the sense of being cut from God’s grace (2a).

final likeness expresses the idea of being an efficient cause in itself (*qixing jie buyoutawu* 其行皆不由他物) : “When the soul resides in the body, the merits and actions of the intellect, will and memory do not depend on the body. After departing the body, the soul can still exert intellect, will and memory, as if it was in the body. Therefore, its substance and actions do not depend on other things, and [in this regard] the soul is similar to God.”⁹⁸

Those eight attributes of God are thus shared by human soul as belonging to its specific essence or nature. This co-naturality with God gives to the human soul a quasi-divine status. The *Lingyan lishao* is still careful to signal in a few instances that, even though God and human soul share in essence many attributes, God is the absolute essence upon which the attributes of the human soul are derived. Furthermore, the attributes of the human soul are limited in scope compared to the omnipotence of God.

After having discussed the eight likenesses by nature (*xing*) shared between God and the human soul, the *Lingyan lishao* proposes a list of seven likenesses according to a process of following a form or pattern (*mo*). First, the soul has a threefold form. The *Lingyan lishao* mixes here two different accounts, one by Augustine and another by Aquinas. In the account according to Augustine, the three powers of the human soul, i.e., memory, understanding and will, imitate the Father, the Son and the Spirit, three persons in God (*Tianzhu zhi sanwei* 天主之三位), so that human beings may remember, understand and will God. This implies that the human soul is not only made in the image of Jesus-Christ, but also in the image of the three Persons of the Trinity.⁹⁹ The *Lingyan lishao* explains also the processions between the

98 LYLES, 412: 亞尼瑪既備物之靈像以行其功, 即其功行不由他物, 其居本軀時, 明悟、愛欲、記含之功行, 不由於本軀。離本軀後, 亦能明悟, 亦能愛欲, 亦能記含, 如在本軀時。故其體其行, 皆不由他物, 與天主相似。ST 1a, q. 89, a.1, resp: “Now the soul has one mode of being when in the body, and another when apart from it, its nature remaining always the same; but this does not mean that its union with the body is an accidental thing, for, on the contrary, such union belongs to its very nature, just as the nature of a light object is not changed, when it is in its proper place, which is natural to it, and outside its proper place, which is beside its nature. The soul, therefore, when united to the body, consistently with that mode of existence, has a mode of understanding, by turning to corporeal phantasms, which are in corporeal organs; but when it is separated from the body, it has a mode of understanding, by turning to simply intelligible objects, as is proper to other separate substances.” Bernardinus Sinensis 9th: “quia sicut est ubique, scilicet, in inferno per iustitiam, in terra per praesentiam & gratiam, & in coelis per gloriam; ita anima est in toto corpore, & est tota in qualibet parte ipsius corporis; sed secundum diversas operationes.”

99 This Trinatarian dimension of the human soul was articulated by Augustine in his *De Trinitate*. See *De Trinitate* IX-4.4; X-12.19; XIV-3.5; XIV-6.8. See also Helinandus 5th: “Deus unus est in substantia et trinus in personis; anima est una in essential et trina

three persons within the Trinity and between the three powers of the soul: the Father begets the Son, and the Father and the Son beget the Spirit. Similarly, memory begets understanding, and memory and understanding beget the will. Aquinas accepted the Trinitarian dimension of the human soul¹⁰⁰ and mentioned also the processions between the word (memory), the intellect and the will.¹⁰¹

However, in the Question 93 of the *Prima pars* of the *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas suggested another interpretation of the threefold dimension of the human soul, not based on the three powers of the soul but based on three capacities given by God, according to the nature common to all, to the grace given to the believers, and to the glory enjoyed by the Saints and angels.¹⁰² Isabelle Duceux rightly remarked that the *Lingyan lishao* follows closely this passage, as if Sambiasi was quoting it from memory.¹⁰³ Instead of Augustine's static scheme of the soul, Aquinas provided a more dynamic view of three different levels of the image of God. However, Aquinas conceived the three levels of the images as a progression from the common humanity to the militant Church (ordinary Christians in this world), and finally to the triumphant Church (the Blessed, Saints and Angels in Heaven). The *Lingyan lishao*, mostly addressing itself to non-Christians, avoided references to Christ and to the Church.

The second likeness under the mode of imitation is precisely the transforming power of the grace, by which one follows God's commands not by external obedience, but out of love. As the *Lingyan lishao* states: "When the soul receives the grace, it is not because God commands to unite with Him, but out of love."¹⁰⁴ The third likeness is to transmit the will on the entire body (*quanmo neiqu* 全模肉驱): God uses objects like tools as He wishes; similarly, the human soul through its spirit can order the whole body or parts of it. As Duceux notices, this reflects the Aristotelian conception of the soul as the entelechy of an animated body.¹⁰⁵ Another likeness is to harbor a-priori ideas (*youxianyande yideya* 有先驗的意得亞): before God created things, He harbors their idea in His mind; similarly, human soul

in potentis: Ideoque etiam illis tribus nominibus insinuandam mentis putavimus trinitatem, memoria, intelligentia, voluntate."

¹⁰⁰ See ST Ia, q.93, a.5, resp.

¹⁰¹ See ST Ia, q.93, a.6, resp.

¹⁰² ST Ia, q. 93, a. 4, resp. We can notice that Aquinas does not explicitly identify the three levels to the three persons of the Trinity, but this may be supposed since nature could be associated to the Father, grace to the Son, and glory to the Spirit.

¹⁰³ Duceux, 185.

¹⁰⁴ LYLS, 341: 故亞尼瑪得額辣濟亞時，其愛欲與否之意，轉合天主之命。

¹⁰⁵ Duceux, 185.

harbors ideas and synthesizes ideas of things in the mind. According to the fifth likeness, by loving God, the soul becomes closer to God, more and more like God. Two quotes from the Bible and one proverb support this idea.¹⁰⁶

The sixth likeness goes this way: God cannot be contained in space (*bushou xianzhi* 不受限制); similarly, human soul cannot be contained in a material space. This is a consequence of God and human soul being both immaterial, as we have seen in the second likeness according to essence. According to the seventh likeness, even if a part of the cosmos is destroyed, God maintains its absolute integrity. Similarly, even if a part of the body is destroyed, the soul maintains itself wholly and cannot be destroyed (*buneng bei huimie* 不能被毁灭).¹⁰⁷

As we can see, the first series of likenesses according to essence listed properties shared by God and human soul, and the second series according to the form described mostly a dynamic relation between God and the soul, by which the soul answers to God's love and unites with Him. We turn now to the third series of likeness, according to the function or operation. There are a total of ten: (1) God is the beginning of all actions in the universe, and similarly the soul is the beginning of voluntary actions; (2) the purpose of God's action is not outside of Him, but He is himself the purpose of all actions; similarly, the purpose of the actions of the soul is not external to her, but it is the soul itself; (3) God understands all things; similarly, the human soul is spiritual and possesses a power of abstracting ideas out of the material world, so it can understand both material and immaterial things; (4) God the Son is the inner word of God the Father; similarly, when the soul knows an object, it produces an inner word, like its inner principle; (5) God lives by Himself and gives life to everything; similarly, the soul lives by itself and does not receive life from the body; (6) God favors everything with His blessings, according to their dignity; similarly, the soul favors all parts of the body; (7) God moves everything without moving itself, and the soul also is the source of all the movements of the body; (8) God directs all, rational beings through His teaching, and irrational beings through His plan; alike,

¹⁰⁶ Psalm 91:1 (NRSV, slightly modified): "You who live in the shelter of the Most High, you will abide in the shadow of the Almighty" (Vulgate: *qui habitat in abscondito Excelsi in umbraculo Domini commorabitur*). See also ST Ia q. 20, a.1, ad 3: "So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates another to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills good to others; yet it implies no composition in God."

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Bernardinus Siensis 11th: "Quia Deus in quocunque loco turpi exister, non deturpatur, vel deformatur radius in fimo, & in stercore; ita anima in quocunque corpore leproso, infirm, vel debilitate, & deformato existat, non deturpatur vel deformatur propter illud corpus; sed solum propter peccata deturpatur, & inficitur."

the soul controls through its three powers; (9) God decides by Himself; alike, the soul is endowed with an autonomous power, and with the help of God, the soul controls the seven passions.

The tenth likeness, according to the operation, is the most detailed. It presents the operation by which God calls people to pay attention to their own soul and to its dignity:

Thus Solomon, a former sage, wanted the soul to know by herself her own dignity, and thus said: “O most beautiful among all (i.e. the soul), you wish to know your dignity. Come out and follow the tracks of the flock (the flock mean the five senses of hearing, seeing, tasting, smelling, etc; and the tracks mean all the objects of the world). Pasture the lamb (i.e. the human passions and desires). Get closer to the enclosure of the pastor (The pastor runs after the desires of the world; the enclosure of the pastor represents the plays and games of the worldly people, searching for wealth and drowning themselves in pleasures, looking for reputation, honors, and other kinds of temporary joys). Only by knowing the dignity of the soul can you find peace.”¹⁰⁸

One can recognize here a passage drawn from the *Canticle of Canticles*, attributed to Solomon: “If you do not know, O fairest among women, follow the tracks of the flock, and pasture your kids beside the shepherds’ tents.”¹⁰⁹ Guillaume de Saint Thierry (c. 1085-1148) interpreted this passage as an allegory of the soul: the Lover asked the Beloved to examine his soul, not by enclosing himself but by coming out, examining how all the creation knows and loves God.¹¹⁰

Through the three stages of nature, form and operation, the previous twenty-four likenesses have prepared the person to recognize finally the dignity of his soul, not as enclosed in itself, but in deep communion with God. With those twenty-five likenesses, we could read them like an ascent of the soul through a ladder towards its union with God, similar to Bonaventure’s *Itinerarium mentis in Deum* (Journey of the Mind in God) or Bellarmine’s *De ascensione mentis in Deum per scalas rerum creaturum* (Mind’s Ascent to God by the Ladder of Created things).

¹⁰⁸ LYLS, 416-417: 故撒羅滿古賢人也欲令亞尼瑪自識其尊而言曰：萬物最美者，此稱亞尼瑪之詞也爾欲識爾尊，爾出隨爾羊群之蹤跡，羊群者，指人之五司，耳、目、口、鼻等。踪跡者，指天下萬物也。牧爾之羔羊，羔羊者，人之情，人之欲也。近牧者之牢，牧者，世間狗欲之徒。牧者之牢，是世人嬉遊戲樂，逐利溺色，功名榮貴等暫歡之所也。乃得識爾尊而可安也。

¹⁰⁹ Song of Solomon, 1:8 (NRSV); Vulgate: “Si ignoras te, o pulcherrima inter mulieres, egredere et abi post vestigia gregum, et pasce hedos tuos iuxta tabernacula pastorum.”

¹¹⁰ Guillaume de Saint-Thierry, “Expositio altera super Cantica Canticorum”, in *Patrologiae Cursus Completus*, Migne ed., 1902, vol. 180, 493-494. Augustine had the seminal idea of the Church ignoring having been made according to the image of God; cf. Augustine, *Ennarationes in Psalmos* N. 66.

Summum bonum

The previous section has shown that the soul is according to the likeness of God. This second section shows how the soul knows the Supreme Good (*zhimeihao* 至美好), that is, God. Here, the knowledge of God is understood in a broad way. The theological treatise seems to move toward a spiritual treatise about the union to God. We can notice that this section broadens its scope by dealing with the entire person (*ren* 人, *wo* 我) and not only the intellectual soul.¹¹¹

The section starts with the attributes of the Supreme Good, as original (*yuanmeihao* 原美好), general (*zongmeihao* 總美好) and unproduced (*feiyoutazao* 非由他造). Its being and goodness are one.¹¹² It embraces the goodness of all things,¹¹³ exists in itself (*you* 有), perseveres in itself (*cunzhu* 存駐), functions in itself (*zuoyong* 作用), knows its function by itself (*zhizuoyong* 知作用). It is the efficient cause of everything, making them complete,¹¹⁴ favoring the good and curing the evil.¹¹⁵

The structure of the remaining section is unclear. However, in the middle of it, there is a clue indicating seven ways to know God: through natural reason; through supernatural reason; through the purity of the heart; through the tasting of His savor; through permanent and intensive relationships; through making the five senses quiet; through the meditation on the scriptures.¹¹⁶ From those headings, we can gather that the knowledge of God is not purely notional knowledge, through deductive reason, but a much broader knowledge through the life of faith, through communication with God and through the meditation of the Scriptures. The text does not follow the exact order of the list, but we can still find all the seven ways to know God, though the *Lingyan lishao* warns us that there are some overlapping.

First, though God cannot be seen,¹¹⁷ He is known through supernatural reason, that is, through the three theological virtues of faith (*xin* 信), hope (*wang* 望) and charity (*xiang* 想). The three virtues are given in the order of generation, with charity at the end, and not in the order of perfection, with charity first.¹¹⁸ Also, this knowledge relies on grace.

¹¹¹ There are only 3 occurrences of *yanima* 亞尼瑪 and 3 of *linghun* 靈魂 in this section.

¹¹² LYLS, 418: 其善與體, 其體與其善, 是一非二.

¹¹³ LYLS, 418: 能包人萬億美好.

¹¹⁴ LYLS, 418: 至足於無窮世之萬物.

¹¹⁵ LYLS, 418-419: 悉能利益於善者吉者, 悉能治療於凶者惡者.

¹¹⁶ 因于自然之本光一, 因於超自然之真光二, 因於心之潔清三, 因嘗其味四, 因於恒相密交五; 因于諡靜五司六; 因于默想, 透達經典深意七.

¹¹⁷ LYLS, 419; Cf. 1 John 4:12: "No one has ever seen God."

¹¹⁸ See ST Ia, q.62, a.4..

Second, human being can know God by experiencing His love, and this makes the soul being courageous, noble, rich, meritorious, and endowed with the strength of many goods.¹¹⁹ Third, there is a permanent union of the soul (*changyurenxie* 常與人偕) with God in three ways: by way of creation of human beings (*yizaochengren yurenxie* 以造成人與人偕) according to God's image (*xiaoxiang* 肖像), not physically, but in the capacity to know and to love;¹²⁰ by way of providing the necessary grace (*yibeisuo xu yurenxie* 以備所須與人偕), like parents educating children, children feeding the elderly, or teachers educating pupils;¹²¹ by way of preserving (*yibaocunren yurenxie* 以保存人與人偕), like God having human beings preserving themselves through the powers of their soul (memory, intelligence and will).¹²² This makes echo to the three kinds of likeness, according to nature, form and operation, discussed above. Though the three ways of union simultaneously accompany every creature, there is an implicit progression: God creates in His likeness, sustains by giving His grace, and finally unites Himself with the rational soul. Besides the three modes of union with God, the *Lingyan lishao* states a fourth mode of omnipresence. This is quite surprising since Aquinas stated only three modes.¹²³ In order to emphasize

¹¹⁹ LYLS, 419: 令我勇, 令我貴, 令我樂, 令我富, 令我有功, 令我於萬善衆德, 種種備足。

¹²⁰ LYLS, 419-420. In the *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard* (I Sentences, Distinction 37, Question 1, Article 2), Aquinas presents the three ways. The first way is: "A creature, however, is united to God in three ways. In the first way, according to likeness only, insofar as some likeness of the divine goodness is found in a creature, not because it attains God himself according to substance. That union is found in all creatures by essence, presence, and power."

<http://www4.desales.edu/~philtheo/loughlin/ATP/Sententiae/ISentd37q1a2.html> (translated by John Laumakis)

¹²¹ This corresponds to the second way of Aquinas; *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*: "In the second way, a creature attains God himself according to a consideration of its own substance, and not according to a likeness only. This occurs by an operation, namely, when someone clings by faith to the first truth itself and clings by charity to the highest goodness itself. And so, there is another way by which God is particularly in the saints by grace."

¹²² This corresponds to the third way of Aquinas; *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*: "In the third way, a creature attains God himself not only according to an operation but also according to being, not indeed insofar as being is the act of an essence, because a creature cannot change into the divine nature, but insofar as it is the act of a hypostasis or person, in whose union a creature is assumed. And so, there is the last way by which God is in Christ by union."

¹²³ Aquinas, *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, I Sentences, Distinction 37, Question 1, Article 2: "It should be said that the divine attributes are considered only according to a threefold order to things: either according to operation, or according to

the universality of the three modes of union, the *Lingyan lishao* seems to construe this fourth mode, through ubiquity (*yiwubuzai yurenxie* 以無不在與人偕), by extending everywhere the three modes above: the way of creation makes God's essence to be present everywhere (*ti wubuzai* 體無不在); the way of grace makes God see everywhere (*jian wubuzai* 見無不在), and finally the way of preserving things according to their nature makes God to act everywhere (*neng wubuzai* 能無不在). This omnipresence of God establishes a very intimate relation: "everywhere it is possible to talk to Him, to see Him, to hear Him and to taste Him."¹²⁴ While the discussion started with the impossibility of seeing God, we have reached here the point where God is seen everywhere in the universe. This may not be a contradiction if we keep in mind that God's essence cannot be fully understood, but yet according to Aquinas, there are still many ways to have a positive knowledge of God, and even to know something about His essence.

Fourth, God is known in this life through natural reason (*ziran zhi benguang* 自然之本光). Natural reason was already involved in the process of preservation as discussed above. Here the text discusses more specifically God in terms of analogy (*bili* 比例), as "the supreme truth, the supreme certainty, the supreme advantage, the supreme right, the supreme completeness, the supreme nobility and the supreme joy."¹²⁵ Yet, it is stated also the limits and ambiguity of this rational way of talking about God.

Another way to know God is through the purity of the heart: the desire to know God does not come from deductive thinking (*jiangjiu siwei* 講究思惟), but from feelings of love (*zhongqing mu'ai* 衷情慕愛) and purification of the mind (*xindi juanjie* 心地蠲潔). Sixth, it is through ascetic life, "discarding all the other goods for the supreme good."¹²⁶ Everything is therefore regarded as dust (*shi ruo biszhou* 視若敝帚), probably here a reference to *Philippians* 3.8 (I regard everything as loss). The last way to know God is through the mediation of scriptures and the testimonies of innumerable saints, bishops and wise people. Their words and deeds cover all the earth, and yet only a very small portion is known.

After having established a positive knowledge on God, the last part of this section abruptly states that God is "extremely obscure and abstruse" (*zuixuan zuiwei* 最玄最微). Human beings cannot know Him, and more they attempt at knowing Him, and more their ideas about Him are obscure, so

power, or according to essence. There are, therefore, only three ways that God has being in things that are understood according to a different order of relation of God to things."

¹²⁴ LYLS, 421: 無處不可講說之, 無處不可見之, 無處不可聞之, 無處不可嘗之。

¹²⁵ LYLS, 421: 倍萬為真, 倍萬為確, 倍萬為益, 倍萬為宜, 倍萬為足, 倍萬為貴, 倍萬為樂。

¹²⁶ LYLS, 422: 為此美好而能遺棄他諸美好, 為他美好能貶我抑我。

that there is a huge gap between ideas about God and Himself, but “this non-knowledge is precisely knowledge and vision.”¹²⁷ This complete shift about the possibility to know God reminds us that even Aquinas had described God as the unknown (*ignotum*).¹²⁸

A final description of God is given. He is like “the best perfume” (*zhixiang* 至香) able to vanquish all the bad odors, glorified by all Saints and Angels for all eternity. Through the three powers of the soul, human beings remember God, understand God and will God, and thus are transformed in “the most venerable and noble” (*zhizun zhigui* 至尊至貴). There are some people who want to do the good for others, to guide them, to save them, and this is the perfect good. “From the time of creation” (*kaipiyilai* 开辟以来), innumerable saints have accomplished meritorious deeds, as true artisans, painters or doctors who have obtained a true and useful knowledge. God cannot but do the good. He silently protects those in difficulties, and makes the most difficult things something easy. He attracts all things to Him. The one who has God, even though he may “have nothing” (*wuyiyou* 無一有), yet he is the most wealthy and satisfied, but the one who has lost God, even though he may “have it all” (*wuyiwu* 無一無), he is the poorest. God is “real, general, existing and universal.”¹²⁹ Only by getting closer to God can human beings understand Him. But one has first to become blind, deaf, mute, and discards what the world sees, hears and discusses. One who makes a very small good obtains an infinite retribution. But one who commits a small sin will commit many more. God is the beginning and the end of the soul, the final destination of all the human acts and desires. Human beings rejoice in knowing Him. By searching Him, they will find abundance of happiness; by dying for Him, human beings will get eternal life. To get into disasters for Him, this is the greatest peace and joy. God should be respected by all humanity, and all the literati in the West worship and serve Him. This book has no other purpose that all those who live in this world know Him, serve Him, and after their death, see Him, enjoying His happiness. I have to admit that, contrarily to the previous sections, this section on the *Summum Bonum* is very loosely built. Yet, it is the culmination of the course that the authors wanted the readers to take.

¹²⁷ LLYLS, 424: 此正為有所知, 有所見矣.

¹²⁸ Aquinas, *Super Boethium De Trinitate*, Question 1, article 2; translated by Rose E. Brennan (Herder, 1946): “God as an unknown is said to be the terminus of our knowledge in the following respect: that the mind is found to be most perfectly in possession of knowledge of God when it is recognized that His essence is above everything that the mind is capable of apprehending in this life; and thus, although what He is remains unknown, yet it is known that He is.”

<http://www.dhspriority.org/thomas/BoethiusDeTr.htm>

¹²⁹ LYLS, 426: 實公有之, 為普遍故.

CONCLUSION

Concerning the sources of the *Lingyan lishao*, I have confirmed the initial lead by Verhaeren and proven with textual evidences that the Coimbra commentary on the *De Anima* constitutes the main source of the first *juan*. I have also attempted to answer to the challenge raised by Duceux concerning the use of other sources. I have especially shown that the section on memory takes its source on the Coimbra commentary on the *Parva Naturalia*. I have also accepted her view that the work was also influenced by the ideas of Luis de Molina. Concerning the Chinese sources, I indicated in few instances how the *Lingyan lishao* adopts some translations from the *Tianzhu shiyi*, while sometimes proposing alternative translations.

From this analysis of the sources, we can solve the question of the structure of the work. The first *juan* is mostly a philosophical treatise on the question of the soul, with some theological additions like the attribute of the soul as created and relying on grace, and also the question of the free will. The introduction of theological elements in the philosophical discussion of the first *juan* is quite significant, preparing the discussion in the second *juan*, which appears as a theological treatise. We could even say that the second *juan* is a spiritual treaty about the dignity of the soul and its union with God. I have not yet been able to trace the source of this treatise which probably belongs to spirituality literature, not so much Thomistic or Jesuit, but more probably Augustinian or Franciscan.

Finally, I would like to suggest the relevance of the *Lingyan lishao* as rearticulating the traditional boundaries between philosophy and theology as they had been accepted in the West. Some dimensions of the soul were traditionally attributed to theology because they were strongly connected to the Bible, for example, the idea of the created soul. Other dimensions of the soul were strongly connected to philosophy because they were articulated by Aristotle and other ancient philosophers, for example, the ideas of the soul as a substance and its three powers, etc. The academic curriculum in the Middle Age and Renaissance had inherited this traditional division, but the Coimbra Jesuits attempted to build a science of the soul challenging it. As we have seen, their Coimbra commentary on the soul and its companion “Treatise on the separated soul” deal with questions about the immortality of the soul and its creation by God, questions which previously pertained to theology.

The traditional division was further challenged when the missionaries moved to a new cultural area and expressed themselves in a different language. Michele Ruggieri in his *Tianzhu shilu* 天主實錄 (1584) attempted to offer a compendium mixing philosophical arguments about God and the soul with expositions about the Decalogue and the Sacraments. This overall method of encompassing both philosophy and theology together was not

well received by the Chinese literati. In his *Tianzhu shiyi*, Ricci aimed at a rational exposition about God, the soul and morality, refraining from making affirmations based on the Bible or on the rituals of the Church. In the chapter 3, Ricci gave a series of arguments to prove the immortality of the soul, and in the next chapter he refuted the Buddhist theory of reincarnation and the Neo-Confucian theory about the unity of the universe.

Unlike the *Tianzhu shiyi*, the *Lingyan lishao* is not a polemical work, and thus does not engage in refuting directly Chinese conceptions. On the question of the soul, it continues and develops the work of the *Tianzhu shiyi*, presenting in its first *juan* a rational exposition on the soul, including also themes which belonged traditionally to theology, and presenting in the second *juan* a treatise of spirituality. While discussing those “theological” themes of the soul as created by God, relying on His grace, and united to Him, the *Lingyan lihao* generally argues in a philosophical way, and not from arguments drawn from the Bible. This shows how philosophical reason, without the assistance of the Bible, was able to build in China an overall science of the Christian soul.